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2 Chapter 1. Introduction
Real estate as an asset class can deliver high risk-adjusted returns, which are also
low-correlated to the returns of other asset classes, such as stocks and bonds. Ac-
cording to the literature, a well-diversiﬁed mixed-asset portfolio should therefore
comprise between 10% and 30% of real estate.1 This holds true for large and
medium-sized institutional investors, but also for small retail investors (private in-
vestors). However, direct real estate proves to be an unsuitable investment for the
vast majority of private investors. The reasons for this include high transaction
costs and long transaction periods (leading to low liquidity), the heterogeneity of
the assets themselves and the absence of an eﬃcient marketplace (resulting in high
due diligence costs) and, above all, the large lot sizes of the individual assets.2 The
large lot sizes and the indivisibility of direct real estate make it impossible for small
investors to create a well-diversiﬁed portfolio, consisting of a variety of diﬀerent
real estate assets. Even one single direct investment typically exceeds the above-
mentioned optimal portfolio weight of 10% to 30% for the vast majority of private
investors, leaving them with an unbalanced portfolio containing lump risks.3 Fur-
thermore, a direct investment would leave the unspecialized private investor with
rather high due diligence costs. To sum up, direct real estate involves risks that are
not compensated with a risk premium, since they can be diversiﬁed and mitigated
by increasing portfolio size.
In order to nevertheless proﬁt from the favorable risk-return proﬁle and the diver-
siﬁcation beneﬁts of real estate, private investors can invest indirectly. By doing
so, the investor acquires claims against a ﬁnancial intermediary (usually in form of
fund shares, certiﬁcates or policies). The ﬁnancial intermediary for its part invests
in direct physical real estate.
Due to its portfolio size, the ﬁnancial intermediary is able to invest in a large di-
1Studies examining the optimal real estate quota include Ziobrowski and Ziobrowski (1997),
Chun et al. (2000), Brounen and Eichholtz (2003), Hoesli et al. (2004), Bond et al. (2006), Lee
and Stevenson (2006), Hoesli and Lizieri (2007), Brounen et al. (2010) and Rehring (2012).
2For a more comprehensive overview of the shortfalls of direct real estate as an asset class, see,
for example, Sebastian et al. (2012).
3According to the literature, at least 20 to 50 diﬀerent assets are required to diversify most of
the idiosyncratic asset speciﬁc risk, see, for example, Brown and Matysiak (2000).
3versiﬁed real estate portfolio on the one hand, but to issue very small shares on the
other hand, thus transforming the lot size substantially.4 Furthermore, the inter-
mediary is able to transform risk, return and liquidity. Open-end real estate funds
in Germany, for example, issue and redeem shares on a daily basis, whereas trading
the actual underlying real estate assets usually takes several months. Moreover,
the funds issue and redeem shares at the valuation-based net asset value of the
underlying properties, instead of at their more volatile market transaction price.5
Another example of the transformation of risk, return and liquidity are life insurance
policies, also known as life endowment policies. As a private retirement scheme, life
insurance policies are illiquid and have a term to maturity of usually more than 20
years. In return, the policies oﬀer a guaranteed minimum return rate, independent
of the more volatile and uncertain returns of the underlying assets (i.e. bonds, stocks
and real estate).
Both of the aforementioned types of ﬁnancial intermediation are popular amongst
private investors in Germany. According to GDV (2006), the market for life insur-
ance policies has a volume of more than EUR 1.000 billion in Germany alone. With
an invested capital of EUR 145 billion, the German open-end real estate fund indus-
try is the predominant indirect German real estate investment vehicle and the largest
market for open-end real estate funds worldwide.6 One reason for the tendency to-
wards non-listed indirect investments in Germany can be seen in the widely-held
aversion to market volatility and stock ownership amongst German retail investors.7
However, ﬁnancial intermediaries cannot eliminate but only transform illiquidity and
market volatility. Therefore, ﬁnancial intermediaries are usually exposed to struc-
tural risks in exchange for delivering more stable returns and/or increased liquidity.
4According to BVI (2017), the portfolio volume of German open-end real estate funds average
out at more than EUR 150 million. The share prices usually range from EUR 50 to EUR 100.
5See Barkham and Geltner (1994) for an examination of the dynamic of prices and valuations.
6See Downs et al. (2016).
7According to the 2016 shareholding statistics of Deutsches Aktieninstitut (DAI), the number
of shareholders and investors in equity funds in Germany amounted to only 9 million in 2016. This
equals 14 percent of the German population over the age of 14 years.
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Since direct real estate assets cannot be traded on a daily basis, an open-end real
estate fund can become insolvent if the volume of its redeemed shares exceeds the
sum of its newly issued shares and its cash reserve at any point in time. In this case
the fund must immediately suspend the redemption of its shares and may eventu-
ally even be forced to liquidate its portfolio, both of which are very unpleasant for
the funds investors.8 A life insurance company faces insolvency if the guaranteed
rates sustainably exceed the return of its portfolios assets. Anticipating this might
cause life insurance companies to rethink their asset allocations and shift portfolio
weights away from government bonds towards higher yielding asset classes, such as
real estate. This in turn may lead to more portfolio risk and regulatory intervention.
This dissertation analyzes the structural risks of open-end real estate funds in Ger-
many and of life insurance companies in Europe. Both intermediaries have been
exposed to economic uncertainty, low interest rates and regulatory intervention in
the aftermath of the great ﬁnancial crisis in 2007/2008.
Chapter 2 examines the impact of a new risk-based regulatory framework (Solvency
II) on the attainability of target returns, the attainability of portfolio eﬃciency and
the asset allocation of European life endowment insurers. The chapter starts with a
brief introduction to the Solvency II Directive, focusing on the rules for calculating
solvency capital requirements (SCR) according to the Solvency II standard formula.
The subsequent numerical analysis includes several portfolio optimizations focusing
on six relevant asset classes for the 1993 to 2017 time period. Optimal portfolios
with respect to the Solvency II capital requirements, with respect to conventional
risk measures, and a combination of both optimization problems were derived. The
results show that the capital requirements according to Solvency II are not ade-
quately calibrated. Nevertheless, due to a solid equity base, the majority of Euro-
pean insurers are still able to attain high target returns and mean-variance-eﬃciency.
However, undercapitalized insurers are not able to hold risk-optimal allocations of
8Chapter 4.2 provides some regulatory background on the liquidation regime of German open-
end real estate funds and an overview of the recent crisis.
5equities, real estate and hedge funds any longer. In an environment of very low
interest rates, these insurers may also face diﬃculties obtaining their target returns.
This is the ﬁrst study to explicitly incorporate the solvency capital requirement as a
numerical constraint into the insurers' portfolio optimization problem. As a result,
the approach shown in this chapter ﬁrst provides insights into the attainable target
return and the asset weights as a direct function of insurers' equity.
Chapter 3 examines the factors that cause the closing (i.e. the redemption of shares)
of open-end real estate funds. During the October 2008 fund crisis, approximately
one-third of German open-end real estate retail funds, with total assets under man-
agement of about EUR 30 billion, were forced to suspend the redemption of their
shares. A fund closure generally leads to fund liquidation, which is a severe issue for
management and investors. Subsequent to a closure, the fund management is forced
to liquidate the fund by selling the real estate assets. The liquidation often occurs
under high selling pressure, and may involve signiﬁcant fees. Moreover, in the event
of a fund closure, the fund investors' capital is totally constrained. Investors can
no longer redeem their shares but only sell them on the secondary market, often
at signiﬁcantly discounted prices. Thus, knowing the determinants of fund closures
could help the fund management to adjust investment strategies and diminish the
closure risk. The monthly panel dataset contains fund-speciﬁc information such as
the liquidity ratio, capital net inﬂows, leverage ratios and management fees for the
entire population of German open-end real estate retail funds over the August 2002
to June 2016 time period. The results of the logit model suggest a signiﬁcantly
positive inﬂuence of fund run risk and industry-wide spillover eﬀects on fund closure
probability. The results also indicate that a greater share of institutional investors
tends to increase the probability of fund closure. On the other hand, economies of
scale and scope decreased the probability of fund closures.
Chapter 4 examines the discount to net asset value (NAV) of closed open-end real
estate funds in Germany. During the global ﬁnancial crisis, the German open-end
real estate fund industry experienced massive share redemptions. A total of ten
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retail funds with cumulative assets under management of over EUR 30 billion, were
forced to suspend share redemptions, and nine funds ultimately liquidated their
entire portfolios. Investors of these funds could await the stepwise liquidation of the
funds' assets (which usually takes several years) or they could sell their shares on
the secondary market, often at a notable discount to net asset value (NAV). This
chapter analyzes the discount to NAV of distressed German open-end real estate
funds. The hand-collected dataset covers the entire crisis and post-crisis period
from October 2008 to June 2016. The analysis shows that the discount to NAV
is driven by fundamental risks: It is positively correlated with the fund's leverage
ratio and decreases with the share of liquid assets. Moreover, the NAV discounts
are related to potential conﬂicts of interest between investors and fund management
(TER and extraordinary payouts). The ﬁndings also include that NAV discounts
are driven by spillover eﬀects from the announcement of other fund liquidations,
as well as by investor sentiment, which is approximated by the aggregate level of
capital inﬂows into the industry and by the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty.
The dissertation ends with a conclusion in Chapter 5.
Chapter 2
The Impact of Risk-Based
Regulation on European Insurers'
Investment Strategy
Michael Heinrich, Daniel Wurstbauer
7
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2.1 Introduction
Short-term and long-term interest rates are currently close to their historical lows,
as are yields on top-rated government bonds. For example, the annual yield on
new issue 10-year German government bonds was just 0.467% in July 2017, with no
sustainable interest rate turnaround foreseeable anytime soon. According to a recent
publication by the European Central Bank (ECB), more than half the investments of
insurance companies in Europe are in ﬁxed-interest securities. Hence, this politically
motivated low-interest phase poses a major challenge to the largest institutional
investors in Europe, which together hold almost EUR 7.8 trillion of assets.1 More
precisely, the combination of low bond yields and high interest rate guarantees on
existing life insurance policies can result in severe undercoverage for insurers.2 The
pressure on insurance companies to take action is growing even stronger because the
high yielding bonds from the pre-low-interest phase that insurers still hold in their
portfolios will mature sooner than the high rate insurance policies. Insurers will
therefore be forced to move their investments out of top-rated government bonds into
asset classes oﬀering higher returns, such as corporate bonds, equities or alternative
investments like real estate or hedge funds.
Several practitioner studies report that European insurers have already expanded
their quotas for alternative investments in recent years.3 However, the introduction
of a new risk-based regulatory framework in 2016 (Solvency II) could have signiﬁcant
implications on insurers' investment strategy and could even counteract this trend
in the months and years ahead. In order to limit their insolvency risk, insurers must
now underpin all risky balance sheet items (including investments) pro rata with
equity capital. The required amount of equity  the solvency capital requirement
or SCR  varies considerably depending on the respective asset class. From an
1See ECB (2017).
2According to an analysis by Assekurata (2016), for example, the average guaranteed interest
rate on existing policies among German life insurance companies amounted to 2.97% in 2016.
3Blackrock (2013), Preqin (2013), Preqin (2015), Insurance Europe and Oliver Wyman (2013),
Towers Watson (2013), EY (2016), EY (2017).
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economic perspective, the regulator has introduced a new constraint into the port-
folio optimization problem: The aggregate of the SCR for all risk positions must be
less than the insurer's amount of equity capital (the basic own funds or BOF). If
this constraint is binding, a shift in the portfolio weights is foreseeable. Since the
optimized portfolios without the constraint are eﬃcient, the constrained portfolios
must exhibit either more risk or less return. Both eﬀects are highly undesirable,
considering that the original purpose of the regulation is the mitigation of risk, and
that insurers are already facing undercoverage in terms of return.4
Most of the existing literature on the eﬀects of Solvency II on insurers' investment
policy only deals with speciﬁc details of the framework, such as the calibration
of the SCR for certain asset classes, for example.5 There are, however, two very
comprehensive and seminal contributions by Hoering (2013) and Braun et al. (2015),
entitled Will Solvency II Market Risk Requirements Bite? The Impact of Solvency
II on Insurers' Asset Allocation and Portfolio Optimization Under Solvency II:
Implicit Constraints Imposed by the Market Risk Standard Formula, respectively.
Hoering (2013) states that the aforementioned constraint imposed by the Solvency
II standard formula's market risk module is not binding for many European insurers.
He notes that the widely-used Standard & Poor's (S&P) rating model requires even
more equity capital than Solvency II for most S&P rating classes. He concludes that
insurers with a credit rating of BBB or better will most likely not alter their asset
allocation after the introduction of Solvency II. However, Hoering is not examining
eﬃcient portfolios in an environment of extremely low interest rates, but rather the
investment portfolio of a representative European-based life insurer in 2012. Braun
et al. (2015), on the other hand, consider the issue of optimizing an insurance
company's asset allocation when the ﬁrm needs to adhere to the capital requirements
of Solvency II in the context of modern portfolio theory. They run a quadratic
4Besides the eﬀects on portfolio eﬃciency, a reallocation of insurers' assets could lead to funda-
mental shifts in demand and pricing for several asset classes, as Fitch Ratings (2011) has already
pointed out.
5See, for example, Braun et al. (2014), Gatzert and Kosub (2013), Gatzert and Martin (2012),
Severinson and Yermo (2012), Fischer and Schlüter (2012), Al-Darwish et al. (2011), Rudschuck
et al. (2010) and Van Bragt et al. (2010).
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portfolio optimization program, and subsequently compute the capital charges for
the respective portfolios according to Solvency II. They ﬁnd that most of the eﬃcient
portfolios are not admissible if the insurer's amount of equity capital is limited to the
industry average of 12%. In contrast to Hoering, Braun et al. therefore conclude that
Solvency II might cause severe asset management biases in the European insurance
sector.
This paper ﬁlls the gap between the two aforementioned studies: Depending on
insurers' equity capital and investment objectives, Solvency II might render certain
target returns unattainable, cause portfolio ineﬃciency or lead to no restrictions
on insurers' asset allocation at all. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no
previous study that has explicitly incorporated the solvency capital requirement as
a numerical constraint into the insurers' portfolio optimization problem. As a result,
our approach ﬁrst provides insights into the attainability of diﬀerent target returns
as a direct function of insurers' basic own funds.6 Furthermore, we calculate the
critical threshold for the basic own funds needed to attain portfolio eﬃciency at the
respective target returns. Ultimately, our analysis provides an in-depth look at how
the optimal portfolio weights for individual asset classes will respond to a restriction
on insurers' equity capital.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the market risk standard
formula of Solvency II. Section 2.3 introduces the dataset used within the portfolio
optimization, as well as the speciﬁc calibration of the Solvency II standard formula
according to the dataset. In Section 2.4, we run diﬀerent portfolio optimization
programs with the solvency capital requirement as an explicit constraint, and present
the results. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
6Note that the attainability of a certain target return is necessary to fulﬁll the interest rate
guarantees on existing life insurance policies, as already pointed out.
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2.2 The Solvency II Standard Formula
Solvency II codiﬁes and harmonizes the insurance regulation inside the European
Union (EU). Its primary concern is the amount of equity capital that insurance
companies must hold to reduce their risk of insolvency. For this purpose, Solvency
II introduced risk-based capital requirements across all EU Member States for the
ﬁrst time. The solvency capital requirement (the SCR) for an individual insurer
can be determined either by using a standard formula imposed by the regulator, or
by implementing an insurance internal model. The focus of this paper will be on
the Solvency II standard formula, which serves as a reference point for any further
analysis.
The Solvency II standard formula refers to basic actuarial principles, and it is cali-
brated according to historical data. The standard formula consists of separate risk
modules (i.e., risk categories), including market risk, counterparty default risk, life
underwriting risk, non-life underwriting risk, health underwriting risk and intangi-
ble asset risk. Each of these modules consists of further sub-modules (see EIOPA,
2012). In order to determine a company's overall capital requirement, the capi-
tal requirements for all risk modules (and sub-modules) are determined ﬁrst, and
aggregated subsequently by taking into account diversiﬁcation eﬀects.
The further analysis is focused on the market risk module, which is of particular
importance as its capital requirements depend directly on the insurers' asset alloca-
tion. In addition, according to the EIOPA Report on the ﬁfth Quantitative Impact
Study (QIS5) for Solvency II (see EIOPA, 2011), and according to a study by Fitch
Ratings (2011), the market risk module plays the predominant role in determining
a company's overall SCR.
The market risk module (SCRmkt) consists of seven sub-modules: interest rate
risk, equity risk, property risk, spread risk, concentration risk, illiquidity risk and
exchange rate risk. In line with previous studies (see Gatzert and Martin, 2012 or
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Braun et al., 2015, for example), the further analysis is limited to the most important
sub-modules, which are interest rate risk, equity risk, property risk and spread risk.
Generally, the SCR for each sub-module refers to the change in the basic own funds
∆BOF that results due to a shock or stress in the ﬁnancial markets, related to
the module's risk category (e.g., a real estate crisis, a shift in the term structure of
interest rates, etc.). BOF is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the market values of
assets and liabilities. Without loss of generality, BOF is assumed to equal the equity
capital position on the insurer's balance sheet. All speciﬁcations presented next
are taken from the Revised Technical Speciﬁcations for the Solvency II valuation
and Solvency Capital Requirements calculations released by EIOPA (2012).7 This
document deﬁnes the Solvency II standard formula.
The interest rate risk sub-module (Mktint) accounts for the fact that both assets and
liabilities react to changes in the term structure of interest rates. As the assets' and
the liabilities' interest rate sensitivities are typically not perfectly matched, both
upward and downward shocks to the yield curve could theoretically have a negative
eﬀect on the BOF. Hence, the capital requirement for interest rate risk depends on
two possible states,
Mktupint = BOF |up (2.1)
Mktdownint = ∆BOF |down (2.2)
where ∆BOF |up and ∆BOF |down are the changes in the market value of assets minus
liabilities caused by an upward or downward change in the interest rate, respectively.
The altered interest rate structures for the two stress scenarios (up and down)
are derived by multiplying the current interest rate for any given maturity (rt) by
predeﬁned upward and downward stress factors (supt and s
down
t ), which are speciﬁed
and tabulated by the regulator (see EIOPA, 2012):
rupt_stressed = rt ∗ (1 + supt ) (2.3)
7The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) is part of a European
System of Financial Supervisors that comprises three European Supervisory Authorities.
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rdownt_stressed = rt ∗
(
1 + sdownt
)
(2.4)
In any case, the absolute change in the interest rate for a stress scenario must be
at least 1 percentage point, according to EIOPA. In practice, the downward stress
scenario is of much greater relevance, especially for life insurance companies. This
is due to the typically higher duration of insurers' liabilities compared to assets,
causing the market values of liabilities to rise more than those of assets in case of
a downward interest rate shock. Moreover, the absolute value of liabilities usually
exceeds the absolute value of interest rate-sensitive assets. Hence, only a downward
shift of the yield curve has a negative impact on the BOF in the vast majority of
cases.
The equity risk sub-module refers to volatility in the market value of equities and its
impact on the BOF. Generally, EIOPA distinguishes between two types of equities:
The type 1 equities include all equities listed in countries of the EEA or OECD,
while the type 2 equities include all those listed in other countries. Moreover,
all non-listed equity investments, such as private equity, hedge funds, commodities
and other alternative investments, are also considered type 2 equities. The capital
requirement for the equity risk sub-module is determined in two steps. First, the
individual capital requirement (Mkteq,i) for each type of equities (i) is determined
by the predeﬁned stress factors:
Mkteq,i = max(∆BOF |equity shocki; 0) (2.5)
The stress factors for type 1 and type 2 equities are 39% and 49%, respectively.
These ﬁgures are based on historical total return data, and refer to the value at risk
(VaR) with a conﬁdence level of 99.5% on an annual basis. Second, the resulting
overall equity risk SCR is calculated using a preset correlation matrix imposed by
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the EIOPA,
Mkteq =
√∑
i
∑
j
CorrIndexi,j ∗Mkteq,i ∗Mkteq,j (2.6)
where CorrIndexi,j is the predeﬁned correlation coeﬃcient of 0.75 between type 1
and type 2 equities.
Similarly, the property risk sub-module accounts for risks arising from volatility
in the real estate markets. This sub-module applies to direct investments (land,
buildings and immovable property rights) and to real estate funds, if it is possible to
assess and evaluate the risk of the funds' underlying assets (look-through approach).
The capital requirement for property risk (Mktprop) is again determined by the 99.5%
VaR on historical total return data, and amounts to 25%:
Mktprop = max(∆BOF |property shock; 0) (2.7)
The spread risk sub-module accounts for risks that occur due to changes in the level
or in the volatility of credit spreads over the risk-free interest rate structure. In
particular, it applies to traditional ﬁxed-income products (e.g., corporate bonds),
asset-backed securities and other structured credit products, as well as credit deriva-
tives. Depending on the type of product, the individual spread shock on bonds is
determined as follows:
spread shock on bonds =
∑
i
MVi ∗ F (ratingi; durationi) (2.8)
where MVi is the market value of the credit risk exposure of bond i and
F (ratingi; durationi) is a function of the individual credit quality and duration
of each bond or loan. The actual factors F (·) can be found in a table published
by the regulator (see EIOPA, 2012). In this paper, we limit our analysis to tradi-
tional corporate bonds. Hence, the capital requirement for credit spread (Mktspread)
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simply refers to the spread shock on bonds as calculated according to Formula 2.8.
Mktspread = max(∆BOF |spread shock on bonds; 0) (2.9)
Finally, the total capital requirement for the insurer's market risk exposure (SCRmkt)
is an aggregation of all sub-risks using the predeﬁned regulatory correlation matrix
(see EIOPA, 2012 or Section 2.3) as follows:
SCRmkt = max

√∑
i
∑
j
CorrMktupi,j ∗Mktupi ∗Mktupj ;
√∑
i
∑
j
CorrMktdowni,j ∗Mktdowni ∗Mktdownj

(2.10)
where i, j ∈ {interest risk, equity risk, property risk, spread risk} and up and down
indicate whether the upward or downward stress scenario for interest rate risk is ap-
plied. The correlation coeﬃcients diﬀer slightly depending on the up or down
scenario. The exact calibration of the standard formula and the descriptive statistics
according to the dataset will be presented in Section 2.3.
2.3 Data and Calibration
2.3.1 Data
In this section, we introduce the dataset used for the portfolio optimization and
for the exact calibration of the Solvency II standard formula. Common benchmark
indices are used as proxies for the respective asset classes. We therefore assume
that each asset class's sub-portfolio has already been diversiﬁed prior to the overall
asset allocation process. The dataset includes the six most common asset classes:
government bonds, corporate bonds, stocks, real estate, hedge funds and money
market instruments.
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We use quarterly total return data for the last 25 years (Q1 1993 to Q2 2017).8
European government bonds are represented by the Citigroup European World Gov-
ernment Bond Index with mixed maturities. The index covers government bonds
from 16 European countries and is frequently used as a benchmark index. Corpo-
rate bonds are represented by the Barclays U.S. Corporate Bonds Market Index,
since there is no European benchmark index with a suﬃciently long time series for
corporate bonds.9 This index consists of various investment-grade bonds with dif-
ferent maturities, which is in line with the actual bond portfolios held by European
insurers. Stocks are represented by the MSCI Europe Total Return Index. Short-
term money market investments are represented by the JP Morgan Euro 1M Cash
Total Return Index. Direct real estate is represented by the IPD U.K. Property
Total Return Index, which is also used by EIOPA for the overall calibration of the
standard formula's property risk sub-module (see EIOPA, 2012). Since the index
is based on valuations rather than on the actual transaction prices of properties,
the capital return component is subject to the so-called appraisal smoothing bias.
Hence, we follow Rehring (2012) and correct the capital returns by using the un-
smoothing approach of Barkham and Geltner (1994). In addition, direct real estate
investments entail high transaction costs. Therefore, we correct the total returns for
overall transaction costs of 7%, as proposed by Collet et al. (2003), Marcato and
Key (2005) and Rehring (2012). Finally, hedge fund investments are represented by
the HFRI Fund Weighted Composite Index, which is a commonly used industry-level
performance benchmark.
2.3.2 Calibration of the Solvency II Standard Formula
To calculate the individual SCR for each of the six asset classes, as well as the
aggregated SCR for the resulting portfolio (i.e., SRCmkt), we apply the EIOPA
8All data is obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
9The BofA Merrill Lynch (Code: MLEX-PEE) European corporate bond index only dates back
to 1996. The index shows a very similar risk-return proﬁle and correlation patterns. Therefore,
our results are unlikely to be aﬀected by the choice of this index.
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speciﬁcations as presented in Section 2.2, taking into consideration the character-
istics of the aforementioned benchmark indices. For direct real estate, a 25% SCR
must be applied. While the MSCI Europe Index is classiﬁed as type 1 equities
with a 39% SCR, the HFRI Fund Weighted Composite Index is classiﬁed as type 2
equities, and thus requires a 49% SCR. The capital charges for both types of equities
are aggregated, using the regulatory prescribed correlation of 0.75 as described in
Formula 2.6. Government bonds and money market instruments are not subject to
capital charges, and therefore do not enter the SCR calculations directly. However,
the overall portfolio's SCR also depends on the allocation of government bonds, as
the allocation of government bonds aﬀects the duration of the portfolio and therefore
the SCR for interest rate risk. The interest rate sensitivity of government bonds is
given by the modiﬁed duration of the Citigroup European World Government Bond
Index (5.03 as of 02/2017).
To determine the SCR for the spread risk module, Formula 2.8 from Section 2.2 is
applied. The respective duration and rating of the corporate bond portfolio deter-
mines the exact SCR. We use the modiﬁed duration of the Barclays U.S. Corporate
Bond Market Index as of 02/2017, which is 7.16. Since the index represents a
bucket of investment-grade ﬁxed-income securities, we average the spread shocks
across several credit quality buckets for the aforementioned duration of 7.16, using
the prescribed formulas taken from the EIOPA speciﬁcations for the Solvency II
standard formula (see EIOPA, 2012). As a result, we obtain an 8.9% SCR for the
spread risk module.
For the interest rate risk module, we use a simpliﬁed approach suggested by Hoering
(2013), who determines the capital requirement based on the total duration gap be-
tween assets and liabilities. The duration gap is calculated as the diﬀerence between
the duration of the asset side and the duration of the liability side of the balance
sheet, and hence indicates the interest rate sensitivity of the basic own funds (BOF)
of the insurer. The duration of the asset side is determined by the actual portfolio
allocation, or, more precisely, by the relative weights of the government bonds and
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corporate bonds and by their respective durations. In contrast, the duration of the
liability side is given exogenously. We use the information provided by the CEIOP's
Report on its fourth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS4) for Solvency II (CEIOPS,
2008), according to which the median duration of the liabilities of life insurers in
Europe is 8.9. Moreover, Braun et al. (2014) set the duration of representative life
insurers' liabilities to 10.0, based on several practitioner studies for the German life
insurance market. We use the average, and set the duration of the liability side to
9.5 in this study.
Following Braun et al. (2014) and Hoering (2013), the interest rate shock is approx-
imated by parallel upward and downward shifts of the interest rate structure curve.
As a result of the low interest rate environment, the respective upward and down-
ward shock factors are currently extremely small (see Formula 2.3 and Formula 2.4).
However, as per the EIOPA framework, we consider the minimum shock factor of
1 percentage point for the further analysis. In addition, given the presented cali-
bration, the duration of liabilities exceeds the duration of assets for every possible
portfolio composition, so we limit the further analysis to the downward shock sce-
nario. To summarize, we model the risk of interest rate changes as a -1 percentage
point parallel shift in the interest rate structure curve. The actual SCR for interest
rate risk is therefore determined by multiplying the downward interest rate shock of
-1 percentage point by the duration gap, which in turn is determined by the respec-
tive portfolio allocation. For example, a duration gap of 6.0 would require capital
charges for the interest rate risk of 6.0%.
2.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 depicts the empirical risk and return proﬁles for the benchmark indices, as
well as the empirical and regulatory correlation matrices and the SCR. The upper
ﬁgures in the ﬁrst section of the table show the empirical correlations between the
returns of the benchmark indices. The ﬁgures in parentheses below show the reg-
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics and Solvency II Standard Formula
Calibration
Direct Real
Estate
Hedge Funds Money
Market
Corp. Bonds Stocks
(Europe)
Govt. Bonds Interest Rate
Risk
Direct 1.00
Real Estate (1.00)
Hedge 0.14 1.00
Funds (0.75) (1.00)
Money 0.03 0.05 1.00
Market - - -
Corp 0.19 -0.04 0.52 1.00
Bonds (0.50) (0.75) - (1.00)
Stocks 0.47 0.18 0.06 0.14 1.00
(Europe) (0.75) (0.75/1.00) - (0.75) (1.00)
Govt. -0.13 0.37 0.29 0.07 -0.02 1.00
Bonds - - - - - -
Interest Rate - - - - - - -
Risk (0.50) (0.50) - (0.50) (0.50) - (1.00)
Mean 1.90% 2.62% 0.75% 1.83% 2.45 % 1.33% -
STD(σ) 5.08% 5.32% 0.62% 3.17% 9.51 % 1.89% -
SCR 25.00% 49.00% - 8.86% 39.00 % - 1% × DG
99.5% VaR 18.38% 16.50% 0.15% 8.82% 38.84 % 4.31% -
Duration - - - 7.16 - 5.03 -
The upper division of the table shows the empirical correlation coeﬃcients and the regulatory correlation coeﬃcients
(in parentheses below). All correlations refer to the downward interest rate shock scenario. Stocks and hedge funds
are aggregated ﬁrst with a 0.75 correlation. The lower division of the table shows the mean quarterly returns of the
assets and the corresponding standard deviations (σ). Moreover, the capital requirements (SCR) and the values at
risk (VaR) as their empirical counterparts are presented. The interest rate risk's SCR must be calculated depending
on the actual duration gap (DG). The respective durations for the assets are outlined in the last row.
ulatory correlations as imposed by EIOPA (2012). The second section of the table
provides information on the mean quarterly returns, the standard deviations, the
empirical VaR (on an annual basis) as well as the corresponding SCR, as already
outlined in Section 3.2.
The descriptive statistics show the expected risk-return relationship for the bench-
mark indices: Short-term money market instruments yield the lowest returns and
also exhibit the lowest risk in terms of standard deviation. At the other extreme are
stocks with a mean quarterly return of 2.45% and a standard deviation of 9.51%,
thus representing the riskiest and best-yielding asset class, except for hedge funds.
The rather high capital requirements for high yielding assets (stocks, hedge funds
and real estate) indicate that certain target returns may no longer be attainable for
insurers with a low equity base, as already conjectured in the introduction. More-
over, the SCR calculated by EIOPA in 2012 does not seem to be in line with its
empirical counterpart any longer. The indices we use show a value at risk of only
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18.38% for real estate and only 16.50% for hedge funds, as opposed to 25% SCR and
49% SCR, respectively.10 Similarly, the correlation ﬁgures imposed by the Solvency
II standard formula severely overestimate the empirical correlations, which under-
mines the incentive for a thorough portfolio diversiﬁcation. The parameterization of
the standard formula may therefore not only render certain target returns unattain-
able, but may also lead to ineﬃcient portfolio allocations and increase investment
risk, instead of mitigating risk.
In the next section, we further analyze the eﬀects of the potentially incorrectly
parameterized capital requirements of the Solvency II standard formula in a dynamic
portfolio optimization context.
2.4 Portfolio Optimization
2.4.1 Attainability of Target Returns and Portfolio Eﬃciency
The attainable target return as a function of insurers' basic own funds is obtained
by solving the well-known quadratic portfolio optimization program, as ﬁrst intro-
duced by Markowitz (1952). The covariance matrix (Σreg) is comprised of capital
requirements (SCR) and regulatory-imposed correlations, instead of empirical stan-
10In accordance with the EIOPA framework, the value at risk was calculated on an annual basis
for the 99.5% level.
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dard deviations (σ) and empirical correlations.11 The optimization program can be
stated as follows:
min
w
: SCRmkt =
√
w′Σregw, (2.11)
subject to w′M = µtarget, (2.12)
wi ≥ 0, (2.13)
w′1 = 1, (2.14)
and wi ≤ ui i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 6}, (2.15)
where:
• wi is the weight of asset class i,
• w is the column vector of portfolio weights,
• M is the column vector of mean returns, and
• ui is the upper limit for the weight of asset class i.
The optimization objective is to minimize the portfolio's SCR with respect to a given
target return (Equations 2.11 and 2.12). Equation 2.13 excludes short positions,
and Equation 2.14 constrains the budget. In addition, Equation 2.15 introduces
11The Solvency II covariance matrix is calculated as the outer product of the regulatory cor-
relation matrix (Rreg) and the column vector of capital requirements (SCR), both as shown in
Table 2.1 (Σreg = SCR⊗Rreg⊗SCR′). The resulting matrix is not positive semi-deﬁnite, which
may cause a discontinuity in the quadratic objective function (Equation 2.11). We therefore ap-
ply the algorithm of Higham (2002) in order to obtain the nearest positive semi-deﬁnite matrix.
Furthermore, there are circularity issues: Both the equity SCR and the interest rate SCR are a
function of the portfolio weights themselves (i.e., a function of the solution vector of the optimiza-
tion program). While the equity SCR accounts for diversiﬁcation within the equity sub-module,
the interest rate SCR is determined by the duration gap, which in turn depends on the weights of
corporate bonds and government bonds. To overcome these issues, all N permissible combinations
of hedge funds, stocks, corporate bonds and government bonds are enumerated up to the fourth
decimal place. For any given target return, the original problem is now solved N times. Each of
the N optimizations uses the corresponding preset asset weights as additional constraints (i.e., the
weights of the four asset classes with circularity issues are held constant). Hence, the covariance
matrix no longer exhibits circular references. Finally, the portfolio allocation with the lowest SCR
of all the N optimization results is chosen as the global optimum for the respective target return.
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investment limits to ensure that only realistic portfolios are obtained. The limits
are derived from previous European regulatory standards, which are still reﬂected
in the actual portfolios of European insurers.12 Speciﬁcally, real estate weights are
capped at 25%, hedge fund weights at 5%, stocks at 35% and equities (hedge funds
and stocks together) are not allowed to exceed 35% of total assets.
The optimization program is solved for all achievable target returns.13 The resulting
portfolios exhibit the lowest possible capital charges for any given target return. The
results likewise show the maximum attainable target return for any given SCR (i.e.,
any exogenously given amount of basic own funds). The attainability of portfolio
eﬃciency depending on the insurers' basic own funds is derived in a straightforward
way. We run the portfolio optimization program as described by Equations 2.11 to
2.15, replacing the regulatory covariance matrix (Σreg) with the empirical covariance
matrix (Σemp) in order to obtain the set of mean-variance-eﬃcient portfolios. Sub-
sequently, we calculate the SCR induced by the mean-variance-eﬃcient portfolios,
using Formula 2.10.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the results of both optimization programs in the µ-SCR-space.
The SCR-optimal frontier is plotted as a solid line, while the mean-variance-eﬃcient
portfolios are plotted as a dashed line. It is obvious that the SCR-optimal portfolios
lead to much lower capital requirements than the mean-variance-eﬃcient portfolios.
In other words, almost any target return is attainable with a much lower amount of
basic own funds if the insurer strictly adheres to the Solvency II standard formula
instead of minimizing investment risk. This ﬁrst result already shows the incom-
patibility between actual investment risk and the market risk capital requirements
according to Solvency II. Moreover, the asset allocations and the investment risk dif-
fer decisively between the results of both optimization programs. The SCR-optimal
12The investment limits we use are particularly inspired by the German Regulation on the
Investment of Restricted Assets of Insurance Undertakings (Investment Regulation; German:
Anlageverordnung).
13The lowest portfolio target return is determined by the asset class with the lowest expected
return, i.e., money market. At the other extreme, the highest portfolio target return is achieved by
sequentially increasing the weights of the assets with higher expected returns, until the individual
investment limits are reached.
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Figure 2.1: Optimized Portfolios in the µ-SCR-Space
See text for explanations.
frontier is characterized by four points, which are depicted in Figure 2.1: The Min-
SCR-portfolio at the lower left end of the curve consists of 100% government bonds.
This is not surprising, since government bonds have no SCR as such, but they have
a duration of 5.03, which enables them to hedge insurers' liabilities against interest
rate shocks. The portfolio at point 2 consists of 100% corporate bonds. Corporate
bonds have comparably low capital requirements, but also have very good abilities
to hedge liabilities against interest rate shocks (a duration of 7.16). At point 3, the
portfolio consists of 65% corporate bonds, 30% stocks and 5% hedge funds. This
portfolio at point 4 has the maximum achievable target return given the investment
limits (µ = 2.07%, SCR = 25.42). The portfolio consists of 40% corporate bonds,
30% stocks, 5% hedge funds and 25% direct real estate. The concave curvature be-
tween the four knit points indicates that the Solvency II standard formula accounts
for some diversiﬁcation in terms of capital charges. However, compared to the com-
mon Markowitz optimization, the diversiﬁcation eﬀect is negligible, and clearly does
not govern the allocation process. The allocation is clearly driven by the asset
classes' capital charges and durations. The asset classes are allocated sequentially
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without noteworthy diversiﬁcation. Asset classes with high capital requirements are
allocated only when required by the target return.
The mean-variance-eﬃcient portfolios also consist of government bonds and cor-
porate bonds to a large extent, as the returns of these asset classes exhibit low
volatility. However, stocks, hedge funds and real estate are now allocated across the
entire spectrum of target returns. In contrast to the SCR-optimal portfolios, the
asset classes are now allocated simultaneously, not sequentially. The allocation is
governed by the diversiﬁcation eﬀect instead of the duration gap. Appendix 1 shows
the asset allocations for both optimization programs' results in detail. Figure 2.2
illustrates the results of both optimization programs in the µ − σ-space and mani-
fests the deadweight loss caused by the Solvency II standard formula: Given a target
return of 1.75%, the standard deviation of the mean-variance-eﬃcient portfolio is 75
basis points below the corresponding standard deviation of the SCR-optimal port-
folio. Using two standard deviations as the relevant measure for quantifying risk,
the shortfall risk of the portfolio would increase decisively by 150 basis points per
quarter!14 As Figure 2.2 shows, the dead weight loss becomes even larger for higher
target returns.
According to the information provided by the German Federal Financial Supervisory
Authority (BaFin) and the results of QIS5 released by EIOPA (2011), the average
European insurer's basic own funds amount to approximately 10%-12%. In the spirit
of Braun et al. (2015) and Hoering (2013), we use 12% as a reference point for the
further analysis. Considering the average European insurer's asset allocation in the
past (see, e.g., Fitch Ratings, 2011; Insurance Europe and Oliver Wyman, 2013), as
well as the past performance of the asset classes, the quarterly target return used
to be approximately 1.75% (or 7% p.a.). This is suﬃcient to cover the high interest
rate guarantees on existing insurance policies and additional overhead costs.
As the vertical gridline in Figure 2.1 shows, quarterly returns of up to 1.88% are at-
14This corresponds to a value at risk of approximately 95%, assuming returns are normally,
identically and independently distributed.
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Figure 2.2: Optimized Portfolios in the µ-σ-Space
See text for explanations.
tainable with basic own funds of 12%. However, only 1.68% are eﬃciently attainable.
The eﬃcient portfolio with a 1.75% quarterly return induces an SCR of 13.45%. This
result shows that average and overcapitalized European insurers are well equipped
to fulﬁll the capital requirements according to the Solvency II standard formula and
minimize their portfolios' investment risk at the same time. However, the situation
turns out diﬀerently for undercapitalized market participants. According to the
QIS5 results of EIOPA (2011), one-quarter of all European insurers are at risk of
not meeting the capital requirements imposed by Solvency II. Putting aside opera-
tional risks (e.g., insuﬃcient reinsurance or high concentration risk), it is likely that
these insurers' basic own funds amount to less than 12%. As Figure 2.1 shows, the
attainable target return decreases sharply for insurers with basic own funds below
10%. The eﬃciently attainable target return decreases even more rapidly. Portfolio
eﬃciency is not attainable at all for insurers with basic own funds below 10%. Un-
dercapitalized insurers will not be able to increase their allocations of equities and
alternative assets in the search for higher returns and portfolio diversiﬁcation. On
the contrary, undercapitalized insurers might be forced to reduce these asset classes
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in order to match their portfolio's capital requirement with their basic own funds.
In the next section, we analyze how the optimal portfolio weights for the individual
asset classes respond to a restriction on insurers' basic own funds.
2.4.2 Eﬀects on the Allocations of Individual Asset Classes
The optimization programs run in Section 4.1 can be considered as extreme points.
No insurer will strictly adhere to only one of the optimization objectives (SCR or
standard deviation). Rather, in practice, it is the combination of both optimiza-
tions that is of particular relevance. We therefore include the insurers' basic own
funds as an additional constraint into the standard mean-variance optimization. The
optimization program is now formulated as follows:
min
w
: σ =
√
w′Σempw, (2.16)
subject to w′M = µtarget, (2.17)
wi ≥ 0, (2.18)
w′1 = 1, (2.19)
wi ≤ ui i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 6}, (2.20)
and BOF =
√
w′Σregw, (2.21)
where:
• BOF is the basic own funds of the insurer.
Equation 2.21 ensures that the resulting SCR (right-hand side) stays below the
insurer's basic own funds (left-hand side), while the portfolios are optimized with
regard to investment risk (Equation 2.16). The BOF serves as an upper boundary,
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and is given exogenously by the equity capital of the individual insurer. By varying
the BOF, it is now possible to derive the optimal portfolio allocation for any given
combination of capital budget and target return.
The optimization program is solved for all achievable target returns and for four
diﬀerent levels of BOF (8%, 10%, 12% and 14%). The six panels depicted in Figure
2.3 show the target returns on the horizontal axis, and the respective asset weights
on the vertical axis. The four levels of basic own funds are indicated by the legends
underneath the respective panels. In addition, the unrestricted portfolio weights are
shown as solid black lines and the quarterly target return of 1.75% is indicated by
the vertical grid line.
When interpreting the results for a quarterly target return of 1.75%, it becomes
evident that stocks, hedge funds and real estate allocations react extremely sensi-
tively to a restriction on insurers' basic own funds. Government bonds are robust
to variations in the BOF, and corporate bond allocations do even increase after the
basic own funds have been restricted. For high target returns, money market in-
struments are not a part of the eﬃcient portfolios at all. The results show that the
introduction of Solvency II will indeed reverse the trend towards higher quotas for
stocks and alternative investments, especially for insurers with a weak equity base.
Insurers with basic own funds below 10%, for example, are forced into real estate
quotas below 5% and hedge fund allocations below 2%.
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Figure 2.3: Optimal Portfolio Allocations for Diﬀerent Levels of Basic
Own Funds
Panel a: Allocation of Stocks
Panel b: Allocation of Money
Market Instruments
Panel c: Allocation of Hedge Funds
Panel d: Allocation of Direct Real
Estate
Panel e: Allocation of Government
Bonds
Panel f: Allocation of Corporate
Bonds
Figure 2.3 illustrates the STD-optimal portfolio weights for the six asset classes for diﬀerent given levels of basic
own funds. The unrestricted portfolio weights are shown as the solid black line, and the quarterly target return of
1.75% is indicated by the dot-dashed vertical gridline.
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2.5 Conclusion
In 2016, the EIOPA introduced a risk-based capital model for European insurers
(Solvency II), and thereby changed the set of rules that had prevailed for previous
decades. To analyze the eﬀects of the new regulatory standard on insurers' invest-
ment strategy, we conducted several portfolio optimization programs with respect
to the capital requirements of the Solvency II standard formula.
Our results show that the Solvency II capital requirements impede the construc-
tion of mean-variance-eﬃcient portfolios. There are three main reasons for this: (1)
The Solvency II standard formula presets very high correlations between the asset
classes, and therefore does not reward risk reduction through diversiﬁcation, (2) the
solvency capital requirements for equities and for alternative asset classes are set too
high, and (3) Solvency II focuses on the mitigation of interest rate risk, in contrast to
the classical mean-variance optimization. While the latter can be deemed economi-
cally meaningful, the ﬁrst two issues must be considered as misspeciﬁcations of the
Solvency II standard formula. The high regulatory correlation ﬁgures and capital
requirements for real estate and equities (including hedge funds) may be the result
of a principle of prudence, which is reasonable when viewed in isolation. However,
with a holistic view, unbalanced and ineﬃcient portfolios are the consequence.
As a consequence, Solvency II increases the portfolios' investment risk and decreases
the attainable target return for insurers with a weak equity base. Given that the
primary purpose of the regulation is the mitigation of risk, and given that some
insurers are already facing an undercoverage in terms of returns, those eﬀects are
highly undesirable. However, insurers with above-average amounts of basic own
funds (12% or higher) are able to fulﬁll the Solvency II capital requirements, at-
tain high target returns and attain mean-variance-eﬃciency at the same time (see
Figure 2.1). Those insurers do not face a binding constraint with the introduction
of the Solvency II capital requirements, as Hoering (2013) stated. On the other
hand, insurers with below-average basic own funds (10% or lower) are limited in
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their attainable target returns. Furthermore, those insurers are not able to attain
mean-variance-eﬃciency irrespective of the target return (see Figure 2.1). Undercap-
italized insurers are forced to strictly minimize the SCR according to the Solvency
II standard formula when constructing their portfolios. As Figure 2.2 illustrates,
this increases investment risk in the classical sense and might cause severe asset
management biases, as stated by Braun et al. (2015).
Technically, the Solvency II standard formula forces insurers with a weak equity base
to reduce assets with a high SCR and no interest rate sensitivity, namely stocks,
direct real estate and hedge funds (and presumably all other investments in the
equity risk sub-module, in particular type 2 equities). Small and mid-size insurers
with a weak equity base are not able to develop and audit a cost-intensive insurance
internal solvency model to evade the standard formula. The regulator could mitigate
this issue in the future by allowing for more ﬂexibility when considering revisions to
the standard formula.
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2.6 Appendix 1
Figure 2.4: Optimal Portfolio Allocations
Panel a: Optimal Allocations for SCR-optimized Portfolios
Panel b: Optimal Allocations for STD-optimized Portfolios
Figure 2.4 shows the resulting asset allocation for both optimization programs as stated in Section 2.4.1.
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3.1 Introduction
With invested capital of EUR 145 billion, the German open-end real estate fund
industry is the predominant indirect German real estate investment vehicle and the
largest market for open-end real estate funds worldwide.1
Investors in open-end real estate funds trade with the fund's investment company,
which sells and redeems shares at net asset value (NAV) on a regular basis. The
open-end structure is associated with considerable bank run risk (i.e., fund run
risk), because of the long-term direct real estate investments and daily share re-
demptions (Bannier et al., 2008; Weistroﬀer and Sebastian, 2015; Fecht and Wedow,
2014). Therefore, German regulation demands a minimum liquidity reserve of 5% of
a fund's NAV. In practice, average liquidity ratios range from 20%-30% (see Downs
et al., 2016). Nevertheless, these liquidity ratios occasionally prove insuﬃcient, es-
pecially during times of high volatility.
The German open-end fund industry was hit severely in the aftermath of the global
ﬁnancial crisis. As of October 2008, ten public German open-end real estate funds
with total assets under management of about EUR 28 billion were forced to suspend
share redemption.2
We use a panel logit model to explain fund closure probability. Our empirical study
is based on a monthly panel dataset that consists of twenty-four open-end German
real estate retail funds, and which covers all closure events in the history of the asset
class.3
We ﬁnd that fund closure probability increases with increasing fund run risk, which is
represented by a fund`s liquidity ratio and net capital inﬂows. Economies of scale and
1Downs et al. (2016).
2The regulatory regime was modiﬁed in succession of the fund crisis. Nevertheless, our analysis
is unaﬀected by those changes, since fund closure events occurred under the prior investment law
(InvG, eﬀective from January 1, 2004-July 22, 2013).
3In our sample, we focus on retail funds. We exclude semi-institutional funds, which are
primarily intended for institutional investors. Semi-institutional funds are legally classiﬁed as
retail funds, but the minimum investment ranges from EUR 10,000 to EUR 1 million.
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scope, proxied by fund size, age, and the presence of a distribution network for fund
shares, help prevent fund closures. Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence that industrywide
spillover eﬀects from the closure of other open-end real estate funds tend to increase
fund closure probability. Lastly, we ﬁnd evidence that a larger share of institutional
investors increases fund closure probability.
Identifying fund closure determinants helps diminish uncertainty about the overall
asset class, while restoring trust in the remaining funds.
The most recent example of a fund crisis was the massive share redemptions from
U.K. open-end real estate funds that took place in the aftermath of the Brexit
referendum on June 23, 2016. Seven public open-end funds from the U.K. closed,
which represented one-half the total assets under management of the U.K. market.4
Hence, open-end fund participants in foreign countries like the U.K. could learn from
the German experience.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section (Section 3.2) gives an overview
of the German open-end fund crisis. Section 3.3 describes the used variables, which
are mainly derived from the existing literature of business failure prediction mod-
els. Section 3.4 illustrates the dataset, while the regression results are presented in
section 3.5. The last section exhibits our conclusion.
3.2 The German Open-End Fund Crisis
German open-end real estate funds are required by law to close (i.e., suspend share
redemptions) if liquidity ratios fall below 5%. A shortfall in the fund liquidity ratio
is very serious because open-end real estate funds are obliged to sell their real estate
assets within the ﬁrst six months of closure without a discount to the last appraisal
4M&G Property Portfolio, Henderson UK Property PAIF, Standard Life UK Real Estate Fund,
Aviva Investors Property Trust, Columbia Threadneedle UK Property Authorised Investment Fund
(PAIF), Canada Life UK Property Fund, and Aberdeen UK Property Fund.
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value. Closed funds must sell suﬃcient assets to raise their cash reserves and fulﬁll
share redemptions (i.e., reopen).
After a twenty-four-month period, funds are forced to sell oﬀ their entire real es-
tate portfolios and pay out the proceeds to investors. However, selling properties
during times of market turmoil, especially in the ﬁrst months of closure, is almost
impossible. Hence, all the funds that closed in October 2008 were ultimately forced
to liquidate after the twenty-four-month period. Nevertheless, seven of these funds
reopened subsequent to their ﬁrst close in October 2008, but all were forced to close
for good for a second time.
Figure 3.1 shows the size of closed German open-end real estate funds (grey bars), as
well as the size of funds in liquidation (dark grey bars). The graph also illustrates the
size of fund reopenings (black bars). During the ﬁrst fund crisis in 2005/2006, two
open-end real estate retail funds with total fund volume of EUR 8 billion, closed.
These closures were caused by short-term uncertainty about the funds' property
valuations. After a short period of time, both funds reopened. The second, and
larger, crisis began in October 2008, with the closure of ten funds, with assets
under management of about EUR 28 billion. The reopening of several funds over
the following twelve months suggested an upward trend. Nevertheless all of these
funds were forced to close again. As of May 2010, the total fund size of distressed
funds was equal to earlier levels of around EUR 27 billion. Following the ﬁrst fund
liquidation announcement in October 2010, and through August 2012, all previously
closed funds were forced to announce their liquidations. The decreasing fund size
over the sample period, as shown in Figure 3.1, is due to two primary eﬀects: 1) The
proceeds from distressed funds' sold properties were distributed to investors, and 2)
a decrease in property appraisal values. As of June 2016, about EUR 10 billion of
invested capital remained inaccessible to investors.
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Figure 3.1: Overview Open-End Fund Crises
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This ﬁgure shows the total fund size of German open-end real estate funds that either suspended share redemptions
(grey bars) or were already in the process of fund liquidation (dark grey bars). The graph also indicates the total
fund size of reopenings (black bars).
Table 3.1 gives a clear overview of the fund closure and liquidation dates.5
3.3 Related Literature and Hypotheses
Our theoretical framework on fund closures is based on the literature on business fail-
ures. Business failure prediction models generally focus on identifying an imminent
ﬁnancial crisis by predicting individual ﬁrm insolvencies. Several ﬁrm bankrupt-
cies can cause considerable negative economic eﬀects (i.e., high unemployment rates
and reduced stability of the ﬁnancial market in case of bank failures). Kupiec and
Ramirez (2013) ﬁnd that U.S. bank insolvencies cause a signiﬁcant drop in the over-
5The HansaImmobilia fund was ultimately forced to close and liquidate in 2012 without a
twenty-four-month closing period. Furthermore, the UniImmo global fund closed in 2011 for three
months due to uncertainty about its Japanese property reappraisals following the Tohoku earth-
quake. The UniImmo global fund was able to reopen.
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Table 3.1: Overview Open-End Fund Closures and Liquidations
fund 1. crisis 2. crisis last closure notice liquidation
AXA Immoselect - 10/08 - 08/09 11/09 10/11
CS Eur. - 10/08 - 06/09 05/10 05/12
DEGI Eur. - 10/08 10/08 10/10
DEGI Int. - 10/08 - 01/09 11/09 10/11
HansaImmobilia - - 10/12 10/12
KanAm Grund. 01/06 - 03/06 10/08 - 07/09 05/10 03/12
MS P2 Value - 10/08 10/08 10/10
UBS 3 Sector RE - 10/08 - 10/09 10/10 09/12
SEB ImmoInvest - 10/08 - 06/09 05/10 05/12
TMW Immobilien - 10/08 - 10/09 02/10 05/11
DEKA Immo. Global - - - -
DEKA Immo.Fonds - - - -
DEKA Immo. Eur. - - - -
EURO ImmoProﬁl - - - -
Inter ImmoProﬁl - - - -
Grundbesitz Eur. 12/05 - 03/06 - - -
Grundbesitz Global - - - -
HausInvest Eur. - - - -
HausInvest Global - - - -
UniImmo D. - - - -
UniImmo EUR. - - - -
UniImmo Global - 03/11 - 06/11 - -
WestInvest 1 - - - -
WestInvest Inter. - - - -
This table provides an overview of all open-end real estate retail funds. It gives the date of the ﬁrst closure of each
fund during the ﬁrst fund crisis in 2005/2006. Nine funds closed in the second fund crisis in October 2008; seven of
these reopened for a certain period of time. Those funds show a second closing date. After twenty-four months of
closing, all nine funds were required to announce their liquidations. Column 5 gives the liquidation date.
all economic development in the 1900 to 1930 period. Because of the importance of
these issues, the literature on failure prediction models covers a plethora of scientiﬁc
work over the past ﬁfty years, beginning with Beaver (1966). Following Balcaen and
Ooghe (2006), Zavgren (1985), Sheppard (1994), Zmijewski (1984), Swanson and
Tybout (1988), and Becchetti and Sierra (2003), we focus on conditional probability
models, especially logit models. Zhao (2004) for example apply a logit model to
derive the determinants of fund closings for U.S. open-end mutual funds in the 1992
to 2001 period.
One common problem of failure prediction models is that the balance sheet items
are inconsistently deﬁned. However, the fund-speciﬁc variables are regulated by law,
so they are identically deﬁned for all funds. Real estate fund closures are therefore
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somewhat predestined for use in failure predicting models.
According to Balcaen and Ooghe (2006), another important problem is how to pre-
cisely deﬁne failure. Most studies use a change in corporate legal status as the
deﬁnition of a failure, although the closure of a fund does not immediately imply a
loss for investors. Nevertheless, at the time of closure, the open-end fund structure
dissolves, which does change the intrinsic nature of the fund. Therefore, we use the
legal event of fund closure to mean failure in an eﬀort to avoid the problem of
poorly deﬁning the dichotomy of the dependent variable.
Failing to capture corporate failures in a sample time period is another issue for
failure prediction models. As a result, we ﬁnd that the corporate qualities that may
lead to a subsequent failure are assigned to the group of non-failing individuals.
Moreover, most studies on failure prediction are non-random regarding particular
industries or size classes. To avoid a distortion, we include the entire relevant time
frame, including all fund closures independent of age, size, or investment focus.6
3.3.1 Fund Run Risk
Whenever fund investors observe increasing share redemptions that threaten to ex-
ceed a fund`s liquidity ratios, they have an incentive to redeem their own shares.
In the worst case, this vicious cycle leads to a fund closure. The mechanism is
similar to a bank run, and is a serious shortfall of the open-end structure. Therefore,
suﬃciently large liquidity ratios are required. During times of economic uncertainty,
this safety buﬀer can diminish the harmful impact of share redemptions.
Hill et al. (2011) ﬁnd that a higher liquidity ratio, calculated as cash to total assets,
leads to a lower probability of business failure. Gilbert et al. (1990) study the
bankruptcies of seventy-six U.S. ﬁrms from 1974 through 1983, and ﬁnd that larger
liquidity ratios decrease the probability of a bankruptcy. Therefore, we expect a
6Balcaen & Ooghe (2006).
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negative relationship between liquidity ratio and closure probability.
Large capital outﬂows that exceed a fund`s cash reserves generally lead to fund
closure. Individual fund net ﬂows can be a consequence of poor fundamentals, such
as, e.g., low liquidity ratios, high leverage ratios, or excessive management fees. If
investors lose trust in their investments, they may opt to redeem shares.
On the other hand, fund net ﬂows could aﬀect fund closure probability independent
of fund-speciﬁc variables. Bannier et al. (2008), for example, ﬁnd that investors
redeem shares only because of expected share redemptions by other investors. Those
expectations could be a result of reported capital outﬂows, which by themselves do
not allow for any direct conclusions about a fund`s economic situation. Therefore,
capital outﬂows may be a crucial element of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy that leads to
fund closures. Hence, individual fund net ﬂows could serve as an additional proxy
for fund run risk.
The potential impact of a fund run leads us to Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1: Fund closure probability increases with increasing fund run risk.
3.3.2 Economies of Scale and Scope
According to Laitinen (1992), Hill et al. (2011), and Assadian and Ford (1997), cor-
porate size plays an important explanatory role in business failures. Size is a proxy
for potential economies of scale and scope, as well as for learning eﬀects. Hence,
larger companies should exhibit lower failure probability.7 Moreover, large open-end
real estate funds that show signiﬁcant growth in prior periods are more likely to at-
tract diﬀerent, and therefore suﬃciently uncorrelated, target groups. In contrast,
smaller funds are more likely to depend on only a few investors. On the contrary,
Laitinen (1992) ﬁnds that newly founded and fast growing companies (i.e., growth
in net sales) that exhibit high leverage ratios also tend to exhibit higher bankruptcy
7Hill et al. (2011).
3.3. Related Literature and Hypotheses 41
risk. Moreover, Assadian and Ford`s (1997) study on U.S. corporate bankruptcies
from 1964 through 1991 ﬁnds that larger ﬁrms exhibit a higher probability of failure.
Although the literature is generally ambivalent about the sign of the inﬂuence on
ﬁrm size, we include fund size as an additional explanatory factor. We suspect that
the diminishing eﬀect of size due to economies of scale and scope is dominant over
the increasing eﬀect of rapid growth on closure probability. Hence, we expect a
negative overall inﬂuence of fund size on closure probability.
Company age is also a signiﬁcant factor in business failures.8 Young companies
have a higher probability of failure than older ones. Analyzing Canadian corporate
bankruptcies in 1996, Thornhill and Amit (2003) state that age indicates economies
of scope in the organizational process. Therefore, we include fund age as a further
fund-speciﬁc variable.
We note that eight of the twenty-four open-end real estate funds belong to large
German banks.9 Fund shares are sold by the retail distribution networks of these
banks, which are actively advertised by bank advisors. Therefore, bank-owned funds
have direct access to a plethora of bank customers. In addition, the purchase of open-
end real estate fund shares is often part of clients' pension provision solutions, which
are directly sold by the fund`s sponsor (bank). Therefore, these funds have a wider
target group and larger economies of scope than funds without such a distribution
network.
Maurer et al. (2004) state that fund sponsors can buy a suﬃcient amount of their
own fund shares during times of high share redemptions to stabilize liquidity ratios.
Hence, the ﬁnancial power of the fund sponsor may serve as an additional element
to prevent fund closures.10 The open-end real estate funds that use a distribution
network belong to the largest German banks and ﬁnancial syndicates. Hence, we
8Thornhill & Amit (2003).
9Hausinvest funds, DEGI funds, Grundbesitz funds, DEKA funds.
10However, in December 2005, when the Grundbesitz investment fund experienced a liquidity
shortage, Bannier et al. (2008) note that the fund sponsor Deutsche Bank was not willing to pay
for its own fund shares.
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use the existence of a distribution network as an additional proxy for economies of
scale and scope.
The possible inﬂuence of economies of scale and scope are the basis of our second
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Fund closure probability decreases with increasing economies of scale
and scope.
3.3.3 Industrywide Spillover Eﬀects
Although fund speciﬁcs are suitable to describe a fund`s economic situation, Zavgren
(1985) and Maltz et al. (2003) ﬁnd they are not suﬃcient to fully explain the
probability of fund closure.
According to Aharony and Swary (1983) large-scale bank insolvencies lower the stock
market value of the remaining solvent banks. Moreover, Bannier et al. (2008) ana-
lyze the ﬁrst German open-end fund crisis in 2005/2006, and ﬁnd that the closure
of a particular fund can result in signiﬁcant contagion eﬀects to the overall indus-
try. Closed funds could be forced to sell assets to reopen again, or, in the case of a
subsequent liquidation, must sell their entire portfolio. Because total assets under
management often amount to several billion euros, ﬁre sales could lead to lower real
estate prices for a fund`s portfolio properties. Furthermore, open-end real estate
funds often share the same investment focus (e.g., asset class, investment volume,
country share), so a signiﬁcant price drop could aﬀect the overall property prices
of the remaining funds. These funds sell parts of their real estate properties on
a regular basis, and, therefore, could be directly aﬀected by lower overall property
prices, especially during liquidity shortages. Our third hypothesis accounts for these
potential negative externalities.
Hypothesis 3: Negative spillover eﬀects from the closure of other funds may in-
crease fund closure probability.
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3.3.4 Institutional Investors
On average, 98% of all fund shares are held by retail investors. Thus, our research
design focuses solely on retail funds. Nevertheless, some funds have a considerably
larger share of institutional investors than others (the range is typically from 0% to
30%). These professionals exploit stable, valuation-based fund returns, and regard
them as a high-yielding alternative to money market investments.
Prior to the crisis, when interest rates were low, institutional investors used the open-
end fund structure to park their capital in higher-yielding open-end real estate
funds. As the crisis deepened, professionals have to decide if their investment in
open-end real estate funds is still favorable regarding the current risk-return proﬁle.
In consequence, they could even be forced to sell their shares, which could come as
a surprise to the remaining retail investors. This eﬀect increases with the share of
professional investors.
According to Larrain et al. (2017), legal restrictions for pension funds led to dis-
tressed sales of Chilean stock holdings, which caused a signiﬁcant higher loss for
these stocks than for others. Hence, retail investors should consider the prevailing
blockholder risk, which could create additional selling pressure and decrease a fund`s
liquidity ratios. Our fourth hypothesis reﬂects the risk associated with potentially
fast-moving smart money.
Hypothesis 4: Fund closure probability increases with the share of institutional
investors.
3.3.5 Control Variables
Our control variables include management costs as an additional fund-speciﬁc factor.
Fund investors, as well as potential new investors, may consider management fees as
too high, which could lead to selling pressure or a lack of inﬂows. In particular, we
use the fund-speciﬁc total expense ratio (TER), and we expect an increasing eﬀect
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on fund closure probability.
We also control for funds` annual total returns as a measure of fund performance.
While large returns indicate funds high quality, there is also the possibility, especially
in times of ﬁnancial crisis, that these funds did not fully reappraise their portfolio
to current, hence lower, values. This uncertainty about the current valuation could
increase the funds closure probability.
Total return also includes the entire history of dividend fund payouts. Flagg et
al. (1991) use COMPUSTAT data for the 1975-1981 time frame, and ﬁnd that the
reduction of dividends is a signiﬁcant predictor of business failure.11 We expect
funds with higher dividend payouts to exhibit a lower closure probability.
Hill et al. (2011), Dimitras et al. (1996), and Zavgren (1985) ﬁnd that a higher ratio
of total liabilities to total assets increases the probability of bankruptcy. Therefore,
we use funds' leverage ratios as an additional control variable aﬀecting the proba-
bility of fund closure, and we expect a positive sign.
To strengthen our regression results, we also control for the macroeconomic envi-
ronment by considering macroeconomic uncertainty and the returns of competing
asset classes. The macroeconomic development of the national economy, especially
during downturns, has a signiﬁcant impact on business failure probability.12 We use
two popular uncertainty indices to control for macroeconomic inﬂuence. First, the
Policy Uncertainty Index Europe from Baker et al. (2017) for macroeconomic uncer-
tainty. Moreover, we use one of several implied volatility indices (shortened VIX),
which are widely used to account for stock market uncertainty (e.g., Bekaert et al.
(2013)). In detail, we use the VIX Europe volatility index based on the Eurostoxx
50. Ben-Rephael (2017) use a similar implied volatility index based on the S&P100
as a measure of uncertainty in his study to test the impact of uncertainty on fund
management decision to sell assets in U.S. equity mutual funds from 1986 to 2009.
11Flagg et al. (1991).
12Bhattacharjee et al. (2009).
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According to Zavgren (1983), higher interest rates can strongly aﬀect bankruptcy
rates. Moreover, Swanson and Tybout (1988) identify the interest rate as one of the
two most important explanatory factors for business failures. Hence, we control for
the external environment by using the one-year German government bond yield to
account for the German interest rate level, and the dividend yield of the German
blue-chip stock market index (DAX30) to control for the return potential of the
competing stock market. We also control for the development of the fund's target
real estate markets by using the country-speciﬁc EPRA total return.
3.4 Data, Methodology, and Sample Description
3.4.1 Data
We use a panel logit framework to analyze fund closure probability for twenty-four
open-end real estate funds over a 167-month period from August 2002 through June
2016. These twenty-four funds represent the population of both distressed and
healthy open-end German real estate retail funds. Ten of the twenty-four funds
were issued in the 2000s, ﬁve after August 2002. Therefore, our dataset begins in
August 2002 in order to ensure a strongly balanced panel framework. Note further
that a new investment law (InvG) was decided on in January 2002, based on an EU
directive. This new regime had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the legal environment for open-
end real estate funds. The use of annual accounting information is also common
in failure prediction models.13 Hence, our data consists of monthly, semiannual,
and annual fund reports provided by individual fund management to estimate the
impact of fund-speciﬁc variables such as liquidity, leverage, and management fees on
closure probability.14 Furthermore, we use data about professional investors from
13See, e.g., Balcaen & Ooghe (2006) and Dimitras et al. (1996).
14Asset Management Deutschland, AXA Investment Managers Deutschland, Credit Suisse,
KanAm Grund Kapitalanlagegesellschaft, Morgan Stanley Real Estate Investing, Pramerica Prop-
erty Investment, SEB Asset Management, UBS Real Estate.
46 Chapter 3. The Determinants of Real Estate Fund Closures
MorningStar Direct.
3.4.2 Research Design and Variable Deﬁnitions
Our key variable of interest is the closure probability of fund i at the end of month t,
which is calculated as a 0/1 indicator variable. In a fund closure month, the dummy
variable is set to 1. In the following month, the distressed fund is excluded from the
panel regression model. Hence, the closure events are captured solely in the panel
logit framework.
For the purposes of our empirical tests, we estimate the following panel regression
model:
Closurei,t = α + β1 Liquidityi,t−1 + β2 Individual Fund F lowsi,t
+ β3 ln Fund Sizei,t−1 + β4 ln Agei,t + β5 Sale by banki,t
+ β6 TERi,t−1 + β7 Total Returni,t−1 + β8 ∆ Leveragei,t−1
+ β9 Institutionali,t−1 + β10 Fund Closurei,t
+ β11 Policy Uncertainty Index Europei,t + β12 V IX Europei,t
+ β13 German Bond 1Yi,t + β14 DAX 30 Dividend Y ieldi,t
+ β15 Individual EPRA TRi,t + vi,t
(3.1)
Our regression results are estimated using a panel logit model with heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors.
Since the provided fund-speciﬁc data is published with a signiﬁcant time lag, we
include a one-month time lag for these variables. In contrast, the individual fund
ﬂow variable, age, sale by bank, fund closure indicators, uncertainty indicators, and
macroeconomic control indicators, are included without any time lag.
Due to the large assets under management of open-end real estate funds, a closure of
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one or more of these funds will be recognized by both institutional, as well as retail
investors. As a consequence, fund investors will adjust their fund investment strategy
within one month after the closure event occurs. The current market uncertainty
and economic situation are also known by investors at present day. Hence, we do
not include any time lag for the variables.
We use the following two variables as proxies for fund run risk.
Liquidity denotes the liquidity ratio, which is calculated as the ratio of a fund`s cash
reserves to gross asset value (GAV).
Individual Fund Flows denotes capital net ﬂows into the speciﬁc open-end real estate
fund. This variable is calculated as the monthly percentage change of net capital
fund ﬂows proportional to the respective fund size.
We use three variables to test for the impact of economies of scale and scope on
fund closure probability.
Fund Size is the overall logarithmic fund volume measured in billions of euros.
Age represents the logarithmic monthly fund age.
Sale by Bank is a 0/1 indicator variable that is set to 1 if the shares of a particular
fund are sold by the distribution network of the fund sponsor (bank).
We proxy for the eﬀect of potential spillover eﬀects on fund closure probability by
using the closure announcements of other funds.
Fund Closure is a counting variable that captures the eﬀect of other fund closure
announcements. Thus, we test for the impact of industrywide spillover eﬀects.
We also test for a relationship between the share of institutional investors and fund
closure probability.
Institutional represents the percentage share of institutional fund investors. It is
calculated as the ratio of a fund's market value held by institutional shareholders to
its overall market value.
We use the following fund-speciﬁc control variables.
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TER represents the annual management costs, calculated in percentage of the overall
fund size.
Total Return denotes annual NAV performance measured as the percentage change
in net asset value. Total Return also includes all extraordinary payouts, which are
deﬁned as total fund-speciﬁc payouts in a given month relative to a fund's NAV.
Leverage is the absolute diﬀerence (∆) of the fund's debt compared to its GAV. In
detail, we use the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the leverage ratio to correct for non-stationarity.
Furthermore, we use the general macroeconomic environment to validate our esti-
mation results. First, we include two variables for market uncertainty. Second, we
consider the impact of bond and stock market returns as alternative investments.
We also control for the country-speciﬁc market return of the fund's target markets.
Policy Uncertainty Index Europe is a measurement of overall political uncertainty
in the European market. In detail, Baker et al. (2017) use major newspapers from
several European countries and count the number of articles, which include simulta-
neously the items uncertainty, economic, as well as items related to the political
situation.15
VIX Europe is the Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX), which represents our
second proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty. The index measures implied stock
market risk. Furthermore, we normalize both indices to make the comparison of the
magnitude of both coeﬃcients in the model framework more easier.
German Bond 1Y illustrates the German interest level for bond investments. The
interest rate of short-term German government bonds is considered the benchmark
for bond investments. This variable serves as a proxy for the opportunity costs for
an investment in open-end real estate funds.
DAX 30 Dividend Yield captures the return potential of the German stock market.
The DAX 30 consists of the largest thirty companies in Germany. We use the
dividend yield instead of stock market performance in order to ﬁnd a more suitable
15A full list is available at: www.policyuncertainty.com.
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Table 3.2: Overview Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Closure 0.006 0.08 0 1 2931
Fund Speciﬁcs
Liquidity 0.253 0.122 0.007 0.814 2820
Individual Fund Flows 0.002 0.036 -0.566 0.77 3091
Fund Size 36.118 32.772 0.69 136.896 3226
Age 242.927 173.67 25 599 3121
Sale by Bank 0.392 0.488 0 1 3173
Institutional 0.02 0.048 0 0.319 2144
TER 0.008 0.002 0 0.015 2554
Total Return 0.012 0.078 -0.579 0.489 2485
Leverage 0.222 0.113 0 0.641 2797
Industrywide Spillover
Fund Closure 0.195 0.926 0 9 3246
Macroeconomic Control Variables
Policy Uncertainty 138.466 55.911 47.694 394.635 3246
VIX Europe 24.939 9.920 11.938 60.677 3246
German bond 1Y 0.016 0.015 -0.006 0.047 3087
DAX 30 Dividend Yield 0.03 0.007 0.019 0.053 3246
Individual EPRA TR 0.005 0.052 -0.274 0.387 2899
This table provides an overview of the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and number of observations
for all variables.
measure of the return potential of stocks versus fund investments, and bond market
returns without speculative gains.
Individual EPRA TR is calculated as the weighted monthly EPRA total return of
a fund's target real estate market returns. This variable captures the development
of the overall real estate markets, and serves as a proxy for the business cycle.
3.4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics for the explanatory variables.
The liquidity ratios show signiﬁcant heterogeneity over time as well as across funds.
The average liquidity ratio is 25.03%, with a range from 0.7% to 81.4%. Several
funds were issued within the sample period. A fund opening is accompanied by a
liquidity ratio of almost 100% because the accumulated capital has not yet been
invested. Thus, we ﬁrst consider newly issued funds after a twenty-four-month
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Figure 3.2: Summary Statistics
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This ﬁgure illustrates the average progression of fund-speciﬁc, industrywide spillover eﬀects and macroeconomic
control variables from 2002:8 through 2016:6.
period. The liquidity ratios increase signiﬁcantly from 2012 due to the progressing
liquidation of ten funds in the dataset that were forced to sell their entire real estate
property portfolios and transfer the earnings to investors. Figure 3.2 illustrates the
considerable increase in average liquidity ratios due to property sales beginning in
Q3 2012.
The funds show average monthly fund ﬂows of about 0.2% relative to respective
fund volume. Newly issued funds show strong capital inﬂows within the ﬁrst two
years, which could distort the regression results (note again that we only include
funds if they are at least twenty-ﬁve months old). Moreover, several funds within
the same fund family merged within the sample period.
For example, the WestInvest 1 fund had monthly capital outﬂows of 100% (purely
arithmetical) in October 2009 due to a fund merge with the WestInvest Interselect
fund, which had tremendous capital inﬂows over the same period. For the same
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reason, the Inter Immoproﬁl fund displayed a 248% capital inﬂow in November
2010. We control for fund merges by excluding these special events from our dataset
(n = 5) in order to avoid distortions. Subsequently, the Euro ImmoProﬁl fund now
shows the maximum capital inﬂows of 77.0% at the beginning of 2005, while the
Inter ImmoProﬁl fund has -56.6% capital outﬂows in October 2009.
Fund size ranges from EUR 69 million to EUR 13.6 billion, with an average size
of EUR 3.6 billion and a median of EUR 2.5 billion. Fund size is measured in
EUR 100 million. The Deka Immobilien Europa fund is the largest open-end real
estate fund, with an average of EUR 9.87 billion and a maximum of EUR 13.6
billion. In contrast, distressed funds show a signiﬁcantly negative trend in fund size.
For example, the Morgan Stanley P2 value fund had a minimum of only EUR 69
million as of June 2016, due to advanced fund liquidations. But the remaining funds
ultimately boosted their fund volumes due to the increased demand for open-end
fund shares in Germany since 2014.
Figure 3.2 shows that average fund size decreased from EUR 4.5 billion in January
2004, due to newly issued funds (i.e., low fund volume), to the lowest levels over the
2006-January 2011 period of about EUR 3 billion. Since then, average fund size has
risen, despite the fact that several funds were forced to liquidate. Signiﬁcant capital
inﬂows into the remaining funds led to an average fund volume of about EUR 3.5
billion as of June 2016.
Several funds were issued after August 2002, but within our sample period. The
oldest fund at the beginning of the dataset was the UniImmo global fund at thirty-
six years (433 months).
The Sale by Bank variable displays a mean of 0.39. This is because the vast majority
of open-end real estate funds never switched from using a distribution network to
sell fund shares to a system without a direct selling feature, or vice versa. Since
October 2012, the DEGI fund family was the sole fund choosing to use a distribution
network. Hence, about 40% of all funds sell shares via a distribution network.
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Institutional shareholders on average represent 2% of all fund investors. The UBS 3
Sector Real Estate fund reports an institutional share of up to 31.9%, while DEGI
Europa has a 0.00% minimum share and never exceeds 0.30%. According to Figure
3.2, the average share of institutional investors signiﬁcantly increased to about 6%
from August 2002 through Q1 2011. It subsequently decreased dramatically through
June 2016. Nevertheless, the graph may be biased due to the quality of the data
provided.
For example, the Morningstar Direct data is not fully available, because they only
report data from seventeen of the twenty-four open-end real estate funds. Further-
more, at the end of the dataset, open-end funds with generally larger shares of
institutional investors (such as the UBS 3 Sector Real Estate fund and the TMW
Immobilien Welt fund) had provided insuﬃcient information. Therefore, the sharp
decline in the average share of institutional investors reported appears excessive.
Closure announcements are clustered in a few months over the sample period. The
mean of the counting variable is 0.195. In October 2008, nine funds suspended share
redemptions, and four funds had been forced to close as of November 2009 and May
2010. All nine funds that closed in October 2008 reopened, but were ultimately
forced to close again from November 2009 through October 2010. Hence, the count-
ing variable, which captures every fund closure event, includes some duplicates.
TER denotes annual management costs for each investor as a percent of fund volume.
Funds` expense ratios range from 0% to 1.5% of average annual fund volume. The
average total expense ratio is 0.8%. Funds' total expense ratios generally increase
over time. The CS Euroreal fund shows the largest management fees at the beginning
of the sample period in 2002, with a 1.5% expense ratio.
Total Return is deﬁned as the annual change in net asset value. Extraordinary
payouts to investors, due to the selling oﬀ of real estate portfolios, are considered
in the calculation of total return for all distressed funds, as well as in the regular
dividend payout for both healthy and distressed funds. Average annual total return
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is 1%. Table 3.2 shows a minimum annual total return of -57.90% for the MS P2
value fund in October 2010, and a maximum of +48.9% for the Inter ImmoProﬁl
fund in January 2016.
Leverage ratios also diﬀer dramatically across funds. Five distressed funds (DEGI
International, DEGI Europa, TMW Immobilien Welt, MS P2 Value, and UBS 3
Sector Real Estate) report leverage ratios of zero as of the end of the sample period.
The Grundbesitz Europa fund exhibited a leverage ratio of 64.1% in Q3 2006 and
Q1 2007. The average for all funds is 22.2%. In addition, the KanAM Grundinvest
fund, which was forced to close in October 2008, exhibited an average leverage ratio
of 38.66%, while the healthy Deka Immobilien global fund had only 18.48%.
Figure 3.2 shows that the average leverage ratio tended to rise through 2012. Af-
terward, it decreased consistently and signiﬁcantly to the end of the sample period,
largely because distressed funds repay their property-related loans. In contrast,
healthy funds show stable leverage ratios across time.
According to Table 3.2, our ﬁrst uncertainty indicator, the Policy Uncertainty Index,
displays an average index value of 138.46, with the lowest value of 47.69 in Q4 2007.
In contrast, the Brexit referendum in June 2016 caused tremendous uncertainty
(maximum of 394.63) in the overall European economy.
Our second uncertainty indicator is the Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX)
(commonly referred to as VIX). The VIX displays an average value of 24.94. The
highest stock market uncertainty, at 60.67, is measured in Q1 2009; the lowest value
of 11.93 was recorded in July 2005.
The interest rate of German government bonds with one-year maturity ranges from
-0.6% in June 2016 to +4.7% in June 2008. The average interest rate is 1.6%.
Figure 3.2 shows that government bond yields increase over 2002-2008. Due to
the expansive monetary policy in the wake of the global ﬁnancial crisis, interest
rates decreased considerably and even reached negative values toward the end of the
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sample period.
On average, the thirty largest German companies distribute 3% annual payouts.
The variable shows a minimum dividend of 1.9% in December 2004 and a maximum
of 5.3% in February 2009. According to Figure 3.2, the DAX 30 exhibited relatively
low dividend yields from 2004 through 2005. Afterward, dividends increased. In
summary, the DAX 30 companies distributed signiﬁcant and relatively stable annual
dividend payments of about 2% to 4%.
Individual EPRA total returns ranged from -27.4% to 38.7%, with an average of
0.5%. Figure 3.2 shows a rather volatile development of the weighted funds' target
real estate markets. The ﬁgure shows that the minimum was reached in Autumn
2008 during the ﬁnancial market turmoil of the global ﬁnancial crisis. In subsequent
years, we observe a signiﬁcant recovery of the funds' target real estate markets, with
mainly positive total returns.
3.5 Results
Table 3.3 contains the results of four panel logit regression models (I-IV). The ﬁrst
model includes only fund-speciﬁc explanatory variables (I), while the second speci-
ﬁcation also includes the industrywide spillover variable (II). The third model (III)
is estimated using fund-speciﬁc, industrywide spillover, and macroeconomic control
variables.16
Model IV further includes the share of institutional investors. Unfortunately, Morn-
ingstar Direct provides data on fund ownership structure for only seventeen of the
twenty-four funds. Hence, we lose 420 observations from model IV versus model III
(N = 2,037). The standard errors of the regression coeﬃcients are in parentheses.
16We control for the legal fund environment (e.g., the selling restrictions on the properties) and
do not conﬁrm a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on fund closure probability; According to Sheppard (1994)
and Hall (1994), the level of diversiﬁcation has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on business failures, but we
ﬁnd no inﬂuence of regional or sectoral diversiﬁcation (Herﬁndahl index) on the probability of a
fund closure.
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Table 3.3: Explaining Fund Closure Probability
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Fund Speciﬁcs
Liquidityi,t−1 -0.0583** -0.0861** -0.107* -0.221**
(0.0249) (0.0378) (0.0610) (0.0981)
Individual Fund F lowsi, t -0.177** -0.125*** -0.143*** -0.310***
(0.0781) (0.0349) (0.0386) (0.118)
ln Fund Sizei,t−1 0.950* 0.800* 0.709* 2.134*
(0.560) (0.461) (0.405) (1.285)
ln Age i, t -1.271*** -0.772 -1.018* -1.704**
(0.480) (0.503) (0.578) (0.830)
Sale by Banki,t -1.287 -2.062** -1.666* -1.146
(0.796) (0.922) (0.864) (0.965)
Institutionali,t−1 0.234***
(0.0868)
TERi,t−1 3.485*** 5.100*** 5.032** 7.212
(1.236) (1.571) (2.309) (4.406)
Total Returni,t−1 0.103*** 0.0557 0.0392 -0.0176
(0.0387) (0.0668) (0.0889) (0.278)
∆ Leveragei,t−1 0.184*** 0.189*** 0.168** 0.112
(0.0511) (0.0556) (0.0675) (0.0726)
Industrywide Spillover
Fund Closurei,t 0.620*** 1.063*** 1.120**
(0.107) (0.408) (0.475)
Macroeconomic Control Variables
Policy Uncertainty Index Europei,t -0.383 -0.318
(0.626) (0.798)
V IX Europei,t -0.212 -0.475
(0.621) (1.065)
German Bond 1Yi,t -0.727* -0.394
(0.387) (0.457)
DAX30 Dividend Y ieldi,t -1.978 -2.578**
(1.234) (1.224)
Individual EPRA TRi,t -0.0521 -0.135
(0.0826) (0.0928)
Constant -3.607 -7.021** 1.124 0.168
(2.359) (3.201) (4.275) (4.628)
Observations 2,046 2,046 2,037 1,617
McFadden R-squared 0.287 0.530 0.568 0.675
This table gives the results of the panel logit model regression. Model I shows the inﬂuence of the fundamentals that
explain the probability of fund closure. Model II further includes, besides the fund-speciﬁc variables, the industry-
wide spillover eﬀects. Model III, our preferred model, includes further the macroeconomic control variables. Model
IV adds the share of institutional investors. The Policy Uncertainty and VIX Europe variables are standardized with
zero mean and a standard deviation of one. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Stars denote signiﬁcance as
follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Due to the non-linear relationship, the interpretation of regression coeﬃcients in
panel logit models is not intuitive. While our empirical tests are based on the statis-
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Figure 3.3: Eﬀects of the Liquidity Ratio on the Fund Closure
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This ﬁgure compares how fund closure probability reacts to changes in fund run risk as represented by the liquidity
ratio. The dashed lines denote the 95% conﬁdence interval.
tical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients, we use graphical analyses to judge the economic
signiﬁcance of our results.17 Figures 3.3 to 3.9 show the mean marginal eﬀect of
a variation of the respective independent variable over all considered combinations
with the other independent variables. We derive these ﬁgures from our preferred
regression model (III), and the marginal eﬀects of the share of institutional investors
from model IV.
We ﬁrst focus on testing Hypothesis 1, to determine whether higher fund run risk
causes higher fund closure probability. Fund run risk is represented by the fund
liquidity ratio, as well as by individual fund capital inﬂows. Both variables show
the expected negative inﬂuence on closure probability. A larger liquidity ratio c.p.
signiﬁcantly reduces closure probability in the next month. This negative eﬀect is
robust for all four model speciﬁcations.
17Greene (2010), Downs et al. (2016).
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Figure 3.3 illustrates that closure probability increases if a fund exhibits a liquidity
ratio of less than 5%, because, under German law, these funds are forced to close.
Funds with liquidity ratios at 5% exhibit closure probabilities of about 2.5%. Under
a liquidity ratio of 10%, the probability decreases to 2%. Average liquidity ratios of
25%, as well as higher ratios of up to 50%, are associated with closure probabilities
of around 1%. These results are in line with unconditional closure probabilities.
Our dataset contains about twenty fund closure events, which equates to a 1%
closure probability over 2,037 total observations. A larger share of cash and short-
term money market positions serve as a safety buﬀer for investors. Hence, a higher
liquidity ratio decreases the risk of beginning a vicious cycle. Especially if the
liquidity ratio is already low, the decreasing impact on closure probability of a 1%
increase in the liquidity ratio is more than proportional.
In addition, fund capital inﬂows exhibit a signiﬁcant and robust negative eﬀect
on closure probability across all four model speciﬁcations. Capital inﬂows into a
particular fund reduce closure probability c.p., while large contemporaneous capital
outﬂows signiﬁcantly increase it. Figure 3.4 illustrates the marginal impacts. Large
capital outﬂows of about 6.5% lead to a 1.2% closure probability, while capital
outﬂows of 4.5% exhibit a 1% closure probability. Positive capital ﬂows lead to a
signiﬁcantly lower closure probability of 0.7% to 0.5%.
In summary, both proxies are consistent with Hypothesis 1. Fund closure probability
rises during times of higher fund run risk.
Next, we examine Hypothesis 2, whether fund closure probability is driven by
economies of scale and scope. Our three proxy variables are age, the sale by bank
dummy variable, and fund size.
We use the logarithm of fund age as an additional inﬂuential factor that aﬀects fund
closure probability. Older funds exhibit c.p. lower closure probability. The negative
eﬀect is signiﬁcant in models I, III, and IV. The negative sign on the regression
coeﬃcient is in line with the literature. Older companies or funds are likely to
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Figure 3.4: Eﬀects of Individual Fund Flows on Fund Closure
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This ﬁgure compares how fund closure probability reacts to changes in fund run risk as proxied for by individual
fund ﬂows. The dashed lines denote the 95% conﬁdence interval.
obtain larger economies of scope in the organizational process because they have
had more time to establish eﬃcient processes and structures.
Figure 3.5 shows how the marginal eﬀects of logarithmic age aﬀect fund closure
probability. Age is varied over two standard deviations below and above the mean.
Average fund age is about twenty years. A logarithmic fund age of 3.52 (i.e., two
standard deviations below the mean) is associated with a closure probability of
about 2%. In the case of a two-standard deviation variation above the mean (6.52),
the closure probability decreases considerably to 0.5%.
Open-end real estate funds that use the retail distribution network of their issuing
sponsor (bank) show c.p. lower fund closure probability. The negative sign is robust
among all four model speciﬁcations. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
only in models II and III.
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Figure 3.5: Eﬀects of Fund Age on Fund Closure Probability
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This ﬁgure compares how fund closure probability reacts to changes in the economy of scope and scale variable as
proxied for by fund age. The dashed lines denote the 95% conﬁdence interval.
Figure 3.6 illustrates that funds without a distribution network exhibit a closure
probability of about 1.25%. Those with a distribution network exhibit a considerably
lower closure probability of 0.5%.
Interestingly, larger funds exhibit c.p. a higher fund closure probability. This pos-
itive eﬀect is signiﬁcant for all four model speciﬁcations. Figure 3.7 illustrates the
marginal eﬀects of a variation in fund size on closure probability. We use the loga-
rithm of fund size in the model speciﬁcation. For example, for a logarithmic fund
size of 0.88, the fund closure probability is about 0.25%; for a larger fund size of
4.88, the probability would be about 1.5%.
In summary, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant inﬂuence in two of our three proxies for economies of
scope and scale on fund closure probability. Fund age and the sale by bank variables
show the expected negative signs, and are statistically signiﬁcant in the third model
(III).
60 Chapter 3. The Determinants of Real Estate Fund Closures
Figure 3.6: Eﬀects of the Sale by Bank Variable on Fund Closure
Probability
0
.0025
.005
.0075
.01
.0125
.015
.0175
.02
.0225
.025
Fu
nd
 C
lo
su
re
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity
0 1
Sale by bank
This ﬁgure compares how fund closure probability reacts to changes in the economy of scope and scale variable, as
represented by the sale by bank variable. The dashed lines denote the 95% conﬁdence interval.
Next, to test for the presence of negative spillover eﬀects from other fund closures
(Hypothesis 3), we use the number of closures in each month of our sample period.
The coeﬃcient on the fund closure variable is positive and signiﬁcant across all model
speciﬁcations. As illustrated in Figure 3.8, the probability is almost zero if there are
zero to three fund closures of other funds in the respective month. In months with
more than three closures, the probability increases substantially by about 10% with
every additional event. In October 2008, when nine funds were forced to close, the
closure probability of the remaining funds was approximately 70%.
According to Table 3.4, the dependent variable is relatively strongly correlated with
the fund closure variable at about +0.42. In summary, we ﬁnd evidence that spillover
eﬀects aﬀect closure probability.
We also test whether the share of institutional investors aﬀects the closure probabil-
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Figure 3.7: Eﬀects of Fund Size on Fund Closure Probability
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This ﬁgure compares how fund closure probability reacts to changes in the economy of scope and scale variable as
proxied for by fund size. The dashed lines denote the 95% conﬁdence interval.
ity of open-end real estate funds (Hypothesis 4). Model IV in Table 3.3 shows that a
larger share of institutional investors signiﬁcantly increases c.p. closure probability
in the next month.
Figure 3.9 illustrates that a 0% share of institutional investors leads to a 0.75% fund
closure probability, while an 11.5% share, which represents a two-standard deviation
increase above the mean, exhibits a 2.5% closure probability.
Our regression results are in line with the general notion that having a higher share
of institutional investors is tied to signiﬁcant blockholder risk for the remaining retail
investors. Professional fund investors hold and are able to redeem a high proportion
of fund shares. This can lead to additional selling pressure on fund management,
which can also increase closure probability due to decreasing liquidity ratios.
This fundamental eﬀect becomes even stronger because institutional investors can
3.5. Results 63
Figure 3.8: Eﬀects of the Number of Fund Closures on Fund Closure
Probability
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This ﬁgure compares how fund closure probability reacts to changes in the spillover variable as represented by the
number of fund closures. The dashed lines denote the 95% conﬁdence interval.
redeem their shares suddenly regardless of fund performance. This could come as a
surprise for remaining investors due to their short-term investment horizons. Retail
investors who take this potential blockholder risk into account may be inclined to
sell their own shares more rapidly compared to those in funds held mainly by private
investors. Given that we lose 420 observations due to unavailable data, we test the
inﬂuence of institutional share based on only 1,617 observations. Thus, although
the results are relatively robust, they should be interpreted with caution.
Furthermore, we use a set of fund-speciﬁc and macroeconomic control variables. We
include TER, fund total return, and fund leverage ratio as fund-speciﬁc control vari-
ables in all model speciﬁcations (I-IV). Consistent with the literature, management
fees (TER), as well as the leverage ratio, exhibit a signiﬁcant and robust positive
eﬀect on closure probability across the model speciﬁcations. Note that higher lever-
age ratios amplify the eﬀect of potentially negative property reappraisals, and could
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Figure 3.9: Eﬀects of the Share of Institutional Investors on Fund
Closure Probability
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This ﬁgure compares how fund closure probability reacts to changes in the share of institutional investors. The
dashed lines denote the 95% conﬁdence interval. The ﬁgure is based on the results of the fourth model speciﬁcation
(model IV).
cause additional selling pressure on fund management. Moreover, if investors con-
sider management fees too high, they are more likely to redeem their shares. The
total return variable shows no consistent regression results across the model speci-
ﬁcation.
In models III and IV, we control further for macroeconomic environment. In par-
ticular, we test for the impact of two widely used uncertainty indicators, the VIX
Europe and the Policy Uncertainty Index Europe, to capture prevailing macroeco-
nomic uncertainty. We also use short-term German government bond yields and the
DAX 30 dividend yield to control for the return potential of alternative asset classes
(i.e., bonds and stocks).
We then control for the total return of funds' target real estate markets. The control
variables show no consistent or signiﬁcant results across the diﬀerent model speci-
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ﬁcations. This is potentially due to the considerable cross-correlation the variables
exhibit with each other.
Table 3.4 shows that economic uncertainty is strongly correlated with the DAX 30
dividend yield (+0.46), and negatively correlated with the government bond interest
rate (-0.68). In addition, stock market uncertainty shows a similar relationship with
the DAX 30 dividend yield (+0.61) and the interest rate level (-0.22). The individ-
ual EPRA total return shows no strong correlation with any other macroeconomic
control variables.
The regression results for the four model speciﬁcations are relatively robust. Model
I, which includes solely fund-speciﬁc factors, shows a McFadden R-squared of 28.7%.
The model ﬁt signiﬁcantly increases by adding the counting variable for the number
of fund closures in the respective month. Hence, model II exhibits a McFadden
R-squared of 53.0%. Model III further includes macroeconomic control variables in
order to validate the regression results, which increases the model ﬁt of about 4% to
a McFadden R-squared of 56.8%. Model IV adds the share of institutional investors,
and exhibits a McFadden R-squared of 67.5%.
We illustrate the model ﬁt of our preferred model (III) by conducting an in-sample
prediction of closure probability for all twenty-four funds. Figures 3.10 to 3.13 show
the results for all distressed funds and for the remaining healthy funds, respectively.
According to Figures 3.10 and 3.11, eight of the twelve distressed funds exhibited
considerable predictive closure probability in October 2008, at the peak of the sec-
ond fund crisis. The graphs show the prediction for every month in the sample
period. Hence, we mark the periods after the actual fund closure event, because
these predictions are only theoretical.
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Figure 3.10: The Predicted Fund Closure Probability of Distressed
Funds I
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This ﬁgure shows the predicted fund closure probability of all distressed open-end real estate funds. It validates
the predictive power of the panel logit regression. Most funds show their highest closure probability at the date of
actual closure. Predicted fund closure probability after the actual closure date is only theoretical, and is therefore
denoted as a dashed line.
3.5. Results 67
Figure 3.11: The Predicted Fund Closure Probability of Distressed
Funds II
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This ﬁgure shows the predicted fund closure probability of all distressed open-end real estate funds. It validates
the predictive power of the panel logit regression. Most funds show their highest closure probability at the date
of actual closure. The predicted fund closure probability after the actual closure date is only theoretical, and is
therefore denoted as a dashed line.
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Figure 3.12: The Predicted Fund Closure Probability of the Remaining
Healthy Funds I
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This ﬁgure shows the predicted fund closure probability of all healthy open-end real estate funds. It validates the
predictive power of the panel logit regression.
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Figure 3.13: The Predicted Fund Closure Probability of the Remaining
Healthy Funds II
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This ﬁgure shows the predicted fund closure probability of all healthy open-end real estate funds. It validates the
predictive power of the panel logit regression.
Figures 3.12 and 3.13 illustrate the signiﬁcant closure probability of the remaining
healthy funds. At the height of the crisis, in October 2008, half of all the healthy
funds exhibited low closure probability. Only one of the twelve funds showed a
closure probability higher than 50%.
Overall, the model possesses high predictive power. Nevertheless, some funds that
exhibit all the determinants of distressed funds remain open in the aftermath of a
global ﬁnancial crisis. This may indicate that simple bad luck sometimes plays a
part in fund closures.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on failure prediction models and liquidity
transformation risk in several ways. We began by noting that about one-third of all
open-end German real estate funds were forced to close during the ﬁrst and second
fund crises, in 2005/2006 and October 2008, respectively. This led to signiﬁcant
lower demand for fund shares by retail investors from 2008 through 2015. Second, we
use fund-speciﬁcs, industrywide spillover eﬀects, as well as macroeconomic control
variables to analyze the most important factors driving fund closure probability. On
the fund-speciﬁc side, we ﬁnd that fund closure probability is driven by the degree
of fund run risk. Funds with low liquidity ratios and capital outﬂows exhibit higher
probability of closure. Fund management could reduce capital outﬂows by marketing
the funds to a more diverse group of investors (i.e., focus on retail investors by using
a bank to distribute their shares). It may also be possible to reduce the risk of
fund closure by using a more conservative investment strategy with larger liquidity
ratios. However, higher shares of cash and money market deposits come at the
expense of lower returns. We also document that economies of scale and scope help
decrease fund closure probability. We ﬁnd evidence of negative spillover eﬀects from
the closure announcements of other funds. These eﬀects are outside the control
of fund management. We further ﬁnd that having a larger share of institutional
investors signiﬁcantly increases fund closure probability. Ultimately, we ﬁnd that
fund management can prevent closures in part by following a more conservative fund
strategy and by focusing on well-established funds that use distribution networks to
sell shares. Nevertheless, systematic closure risk is a somewhat inherent feature of
the open-end structure.
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4.1 Introduction
Open-end real estate funds, besides REITs and closed-end funds, represent one of
the most signiﬁcant real estate investment vehicles worldwide1, with Germany being
the largest market. As of December 2016, this asset class had investments totalling
about EUR 145 billion.
Investors in these funds trade directly with the fund or its sponsor, which sells and
redeems shares on a regular basis. Price per share is determined by the sponsor, and
is based on the market value of all assets and liabilities. Each month, independent
appraisers reappraise one-twelfth of the entire portfolio.2 Due to their NAV-based
pricing system, open-end real estate funds are usually less volatile than REITs or
real estate stocks, which are subject to stock market risk. This, however, comes
at the cost of increased liquidity risk. The discrepancy between the daily liquidity
of fund shares and the illiquidity of the underlying direct property investments is
referred to as bank run risk (Bannier et al., 2008; Weistroﬀer and Sebastian, 2015).
To maintain the buy-back guarantee, open-end real estate funds tend to hold high
cash reserves. In Germany, at least 5% of a fund's NAV must be held in cash or
liquid assets. In practice, average liquidity ratios tend to ﬂuctuate between 20%
and 30% (see Downs et al., 2016a), although these reserves may prove inadequate
during times of market turmoil.
A recent example of what havoc market turmoil can wreak can be seen with the
Brexit Referendum in the U.K. on June 23, 2016. The decision to leave the European
Union came as a surprise to many investors, and led to massive redemptions from
U.K. open-end real estate funds. As a result, seven public U.K. funds, representing
half the total open-end real estate fund assets under management, were forced to
1See Downs et al. (2016b) for a recent overview.
2See Weistroﬀer and Sebastian (2015) and Fecht and Wedow (2014).
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suspend share redemptions.3
However, the German open-end fund industry was hit even harder in the aftermath
of the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis. Between October 2008, the month after the
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, and October 2010, ten public German open-end real
estate funds had to suspend share redemptions.4 None of these funds could raise
enough liquidity to reopen and fulﬁll all the redemption requests. Thus, each one
had to liquidate its portfolio and pay out the proceeds to investors.5
Besides waiting for the stepwise liquidation of fund assets, German open-end real
estate fund investors have the option of selling their shares on the secondary market.
This option is available both for funds in a liquidation phase, as well as those under
share redemption suspensions. In this paper, we refer to both types as distressed
open-end real estate funds. Although the fund companies continue to regularly
publish NAVs per share, the price per share on the secondary market becomes a
function of supply and demand.
The principles of supply and demand suggest that secondary market prices should be
lower than NAV if a large number of investors choose not to wait for the liquidation
process to proceed. Due to the increasing supply of fund shares, market prices must
fall below NAV to realign supply and demand. Furthermore, the loss of the buy-
back guarantee, as well as the shift from a relatively stable appraisal-based pricing
system to more volatile transaction-based share prices, justiﬁes a risk premium.
Figure 4.1 conﬁrms this intuition. A comparison of the NAV-based total fund size
3M&G Property Portfolio, Henderson UK Property PAIF, Standard Life UK Real Estate Fund,
Aviva Investors Property trust, Columbia Threadneedle UK Property Authorised Investment Fund
(PAIF), Pramerica Property Investment, Canada Life UK Property Fund, and Aberdeen UK Prop-
erty Fund.
4This paper focuses solely on retail funds. We exclude semi-institutional funds, which are
primarily intended for institutional investors. They are legally classiﬁed as retail funds, but the
minimum investment begins at EUR 1 million. Consequently, semi-institutional funds do not ﬁt
our framework, where the supply and demand of fund shares on the secondary market, and, hence,
ultimately the discount to NAV per share, is determined by the unwillingness of retail investors
to go through the liquidation process. Moreover, we exclude the UniImmoGlobal fund, which was
forced to close only from March to June 2011 due to devaluations of real estate assets in Japan
after the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami.
5The next section provides some regulatory background on the liquidation regime of German
open-end real estate funds and an overview of the recent crisis.
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Figure 4.1: Total NAV Volume and Total Market Capitalization
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This ﬁgure shows total NAV volume and total market capitalization of all distressed open-end real estate funds
from 2007:1 to 2016:6. The above ﬁgure illustrates the absolute deviation between NAV and market prices, while
the below ﬁgure shows the relative deviation. Total market capitalization is deﬁned as the sum of the fund-speciﬁc
stock market prices weighted by the total number of shares of each fund. Total fund volume is calculated as the
sum of the total number of fund shares multiplied by the NAV of each fund.
of all distressed real estate funds (blue line) and their total market capitalization
based on secondary market share prices (black line) reveals that investors engaging
in secondary market trading on average accept substantial discounts to NAV.
Beyond these general considerations, however, little is known about the speciﬁc
factors that explain the discount to NAV of distressed open-end real estate funds.
Figure 4.2 shows that the discounts of distressed real estate funds diﬀer substantially
across funds. Therefore, we aim to identify the fund-speciﬁc factors behind the
heterogeneity of NAV spreads across funds. In addition, and despite the diﬀerent
closing dates, the individual discounts to NAV tend to be highly correlated between
funds. Thus, we explore whether the correlations of NAV discounts are driven by
marketwide sentiment.
Our goal is to answer these questions by providing a comprehensive analysis of the
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Figure 4.2: Discount to NAV
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This ﬁgure shows the development of the discount to NAV for each fund from 2007:1 to 2016:6. The discount to
NAV indicates the negative deviation between the fund's NAV and the secondary market price in percent.
factors that explain discounts to NAV of distressed open-end real estate funds. NAV
discounts have already been extensively studied in the context of closed-end funds
(e.g., Lee et al., 1991; Pontiﬀ, 1996; Chay and Trzcinka, 1999) and of publicly traded
REITs or real estate operating companies (REOCs) (e.g., Barkham and Ward, 1999;
Brounen and ter Laak, 2005; Patel et al., 2009). The major diﬀerence between these
strands of the literature and our paper is that the discounts to NAV of closed-end
funds or REITs may theoretically persist forever. In contrast, the forced liquidation
of the funds in our sample ensures investors actually receive payouts. This enables
us to study NAV discounts in a new setting. On the one hand, it is an advantage
that funds are liquidated and investors are paid. However, on the other hand, a
forced liquidation may result in a poorer bargaining position for selling property,
which by itself may justify a discount to NAV.
Understanding what drives NAV discounts of distressed open-end real estate funds
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is relevant for all market participants. The magnitude of the discount to NAV is
not only relevant for existing investors, for whom it represents a loss of shareholder
value, but also for potential new investors, for whom it may represent an investment
opportunity. Fund families may also be concerned about discounts to NAV. Their
prestige may be damaged if investors not only suﬀer liquidity constraints, but also
high discounts to NAV on the secondary market. Moreover, regulators may be
interested in fostering an environment where discounts to NAV are as small as
possible. Finally, market participants from other countries with established open-
end real estate fund structures may be able to learn from the German experience.
Our empirical study is based on a monthly panel of nine distressed open-end real
estate funds in Germany. It covers the complete crisis and post-crisis periods, from
October 2008, when the ﬁrst funds suspended share redemptions, through June
2016.6
Our set of explanatory variables is comprised of fund-speciﬁc, external variables and
control variables. We use the leverage ratio, the liquidity ratio, management fees,
extraordinary payouts, economic growth of target markets, and tenancy of fund
properties to explain the fund-speciﬁc, or idiosyncratic, part of the NAV discount.
External variables are used to capture the systematic component. Here, we use
closures of other funds and total number of funds in liquidation. Both variables can
also be interpreted as spillover eﬀects from other real estate funds. Moreover, we
control for the total amount of net fund ﬂows to all real estate funds that continue to
sell and redeem shares. We also include macroeconomic uncertainty indices, which
have become increasingly popular as a means to account for the rising degree of
economic uncertainty in the aftermath of the global ﬁnancial crisis. We control for
funds' past performance, size, and share of institutional holdings.
Using ﬁxed-eﬀects panel regressions to explain the discount to NAV, we provide evi-
6Nine of the ten closed retail funds were relatively comparable to each other. However, the
HansaImmobilia Fund was liquidated without adhering to the closing period of twenty-four months.
We exclude that fund from our dataset.
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dence that fundamental, fund-speciﬁc variables play a substantial role. In particular,
we ﬁnd that the discount to NAV increases with rising leverage ratios, and decreases
with the ratio of cash holdings. This is consistent with the idea that the risk of dis-
tressed real estate funds depends primarily on whether appraisal values are reliable.
This risk increases (decreases) with rising leverage (liquidity). We also ﬁnd that the
discount to NAV is related to potential conﬂicts of interest between investors and
fund management. It increases concurrent with management fees, and is smaller for
funds with higher extraordinary payouts, suggesting the beneﬁt of investor-friendly
behavior. We ﬁnd evidence of industrywide spillover eﬀects because the discount
to NAV increases when other funds announce liquidations. Finally, we provide ev-
idence that the discount to NAV is related to our proxies for investor sentiment.
We ﬁnd that discounts to NAV decrease with the total level of capital ﬂows into the
open-end fund industry, and increase with the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview
of the German open-end fund crisis and some regulatory details. Section 4.3 de-
scribes our set of explanatory variables and how they relate to the extant literature.
Section 4.4 describes our data, while our regression results are in section 4.5. Sec-
tion 4.6 concludes.
4.2 The German Open-End Fund Crisis and Regu-
latory Background
When a German open-end real estate fund suspends share redemptions, it tries to
sell enough properties to increase its liquidity reserves, and reopen and ultimately
fulﬁl all redemption requests. Funds that fail to reopen within twenty-four months
are forced to liquidate their portfolios and pay out the proceeds to investors.
Selling properties within a particular time frame can be diﬃcult, however, especially
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during, e.g., times of low transaction activity in the real estate markets, such as
during the aftermath of the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis. Lower asking prices can
help increase the probability of a sale. However, in order to avoid ﬁre sales, the
German legislature enacted sale price restrictions tied to appraisal values. During
the ﬁrst twelve months following share redemption suspensions, funds are thus not
permitted to sell properties below their most recent appraised values. After the ﬁrst
twelve months, the funds may sell properties at a discount of up to 10% relative to
the last appraised value.
These legal restrictions may be viewed as overly burdensome for distressed real estate
funds that are attempting to reopen. However, funds are allowed to reappraise their
properties prior to transactions, which eﬀectively enables ﬁre sale prices. However,
large discounts of transaction prices relative to previous appraisal values can destroy
trust in a fund's appraisal values. And a vicious circle may result if a lack of
conﬁdence in a fund's published NAVs leads to higher redemption requests when
the fund attempts to reopen.
The liquidation process is overseen by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority
(BaFin), which determines an individual time line for every fund (typically between
three and ﬁve years). Subsequently, the investment company is no longer in charge
of managing further liquidations. Rather, a third-party depository bank is tasked
with selling the entire real estate portfolio.7 Funds in liquidation may sell properties
at discounts of up to 20% during the ﬁrst twelve months of the liquidation process.
Twelve months later, discounts of up to 30% are authorized. After the determined
liquidation date, the fund's management is transferred to a depository bank, which
can sell the assets without restrictions. This event also leads to an extraordinary
tax burden for all investors, because a land transfer tax applies.
Figure 4.3 provides a detailed overview of the number and total fund size of German
7As a consequence of the open-end real estate fund crisis, the regulatory regime was modiﬁed
several times. However, our analysis is unaﬀected by these changes because all the funds in
our analysis were liquidated under the prior investment laws (InvG, eﬀective from 1/1/2004 -
7/22/2013).
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Table 4.1: Overview of Distressed Open-End Real Estate Funds
fund ﬁrst closure second closure notice liquidation depository bank
CS Euroreal A 10/30/08 - 06/29/09 05/20/10 05/21/12 04/30/17
SEB ImmoInvest 10/29/08 - 06/02/09 05/06/10 05/07/12 04/30/17
KanAm Grundinvest 10/28/08 - 07/08/09 05/06/10 03/01/12 12/31/16
AXA Immoselect 10/28/08 - 08/28/09 11/19/09 10/20/11 10/20/14
DEGI International 10/31/08 - 01/31/09 11/17/09 10/25/11 10/15/14
DEGI Europa - 10/31/08 10/01/10 09/30/13
UBS (D) 3 Sector RE 10/31/08 - 10/31/09 10/06/10 09/05/12 09/05/15
TMW Immobilien 10/28/08 - 10/31/09 02/08/10 05/31/11 05/31/14
Morgan Stanley P2 Value - 10/30/08 10/26/10 09/30/13
This table provides an overview of the relevant events for all distressed public open-end real estate funds, particularly
date of ﬁrst closure, reopening date, date of their second closure, date of liquidation announcement, and date of the
depository bank taking control of the liquidation process.
open-end real estate funds that either suspended share redemptions (orange bars),
or were already in the process of fund liquidation (red bars). The graph also shows
the number and total fund size of reopenings (green bars). The crisis began in
October 2008, when nine funds with total assets under management of EUR 28
billion suspended share redemptions. The reopening of seven of these funds over
the following twelve months indicated a recovery. However, these reopenings proved
unsustainable. Through May 2010, the total fund size of funds that had suspended
share redemptions had returned to previous levels of around EUR 27 billion, but
the ﬁrst fund liquidations were announced in October 2010. As of August 2012,
all previously suspended funds had entered the liquidation phase.8 The shrinking
fund volume over time shown in Figure 4.3 is due to two eﬀects: 1) distributions to
investors facilitated by property disposals, and 2) falling property appraisal values
following impairments. As of June 2016, EUR 10 billion of invested capital was yet
to be distributed to shareholders under liquidation.
4.3 Related Literature and Hypotheses
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to address NAV discounts of
distressed funds in general, and distressed real estate funds in particular. While
8Table 4.1 provides the exact dates of all the major events for the distressed real estate funds
in our sample.
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Figure 4.3: Overview Open-End Fund Crisis
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This ﬁgure shows the number and the total fund size of the German open-end real estate funds, that either suspended
share redemptions (orange bars) or were in the process of fund liquidation (red bars). The graph also shows the
number and the total fund size of any reopenings (green bars).
there is no extant literature that relates directly to our work, our research questions
are related to the literature on the closed-end fund puzzle.
In essence, the basket of stocks held by these funds trades for less than the combined
market value of the individual stocks held in the portfolio (Cherkes, 2003). Thus,
even in the presence of professional fund management, the pooling appears to reduce
the portfolio's worth. According to Lee et al. (1991), closed-end fund discounts are
the result of private investor sentiment, or what are referred to as noise traders.
An irrational downturn in investor sentiment leads to larger discounts. Therefore,
holding a closed-end mutual fund portfolio can result in larger risk, or uncertainty,
than holding the underlying fund's assets.
Our research is also related to the literature on the discounts (or premia) to NAV
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of publicly traded REITs or REOCs.9 It is not uncommon for REITs to trade at a
premium to their NAV, but they also frequently trade at discounts to NAV. Similarly
to closed-end funds, Barkham and Ward (1999) ﬁnd evidence that supports the noise
trader hypothesis for listed property companies in the U.K.
The diﬀerence between these two strands of the literature and our paper is that
distressed real estate funds are forced to sell oﬀ their property portfolios and pay
out the proceeds to investors. Open-end real estate funds can be seen as a mixed
form between listed and direct real estate. While REITs are as liquid as common
stocks, open-end real estate funds are only liquid as long as investors can redeem
their shares to the fund or the sponsor of the fund. On the other hand, the shares
of closed open-end real estate fund can be traded on the secondary markets, of-
ten at substantial discounts. In this context, the discount to NAV of distressed
open-end real estate funds can be interpreted as the price of reduced liquidity and
uncertainty regarding the appraisal values of the fund's properties.10 This enables
us to study how investors price the risks associated with the forced liquidation of a
direct-property portfolio.
Figure 4.2 shows that the discounts to NAV of distressed real estate funds are
heterogeneous across funds, which suggests they are driven by fund-speciﬁc, or id-
iosyncratic, variables. Our ﬁrst three hypotheses and the respective proxy variables
reﬂect these potential internal factors. Figure 4.2 also reveals that the discounts to
NAV are correlated between the funds over time. Lee et al. (1991) document that
this is true of closed-end funds as well, which indicates that NAV discounts may be
aﬀected by either industrywide or macroeconomic sentiment. Hypotheses 4 and 5
reﬂect these potential external factors.
9In contrast to common stocks and mutual funds, there is no public market for the real estate
assets alone.
10Schweizer et al. (2013).
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4.3.1 Financial Leverage
The anticipation of lower transaction prices compared to current appraisal values
is a potential rational explanation for substantial discounts to NAV. The eﬀect of
lower appraisal values or transaction prices on a fund's NAV is ampliﬁed further by
the amount of ﬁnancial leverage used by a fund. For example, if investors anticipate
that the next appraisal round will reveal a 10% decrease in property values, then a
leverage ratio of 50% would justify a 20% discount to NAV, assuming all the fund's
assets are invested in real estate. Thus, the leverage ratio risk may be reﬂected in
a lower market price relative to the NAV per share. Bond and Shilling (2004) and
Brounen and ter Laak (2005), using data on European public property companies,
ﬁnd that leverage is positively correlated with NAV discounts. Likewise, the discount
to NAV of distressed open-end real estate funds may also increase with the leverage
ratio.
Mirroring this principle, we ﬁnd that the opposite eﬀect may occur when a fund has
high cash reserves. Because distressed real estate funds may be forced to sell their
portfolios, they tend to exhibit rising liquidity ratios until they pay out proceeds to
investors. In contrast to the appraisal values of the properties, a fund's liquid assets
generally have little to zero market or appraisal risk, and can be considered safe for
investors. Consistent with the idea that investors appreciate higher liquidity ratios,
Fecht and Wedow (2014) ﬁnd that lower liquidity ratios are associated with higher
redemptions. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between the liquidity
ratio of a fund and its discount to NAV. The potential impact of the fundamental
risk associated with the degree of ﬁnancial leverage employed by a fund leads to
Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1: The discount to NAV increases (decreases) with the leverage (liq-
uidity) ratio of a fund.
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4.3.2 Conﬂicts of Interest
According to the closed-end fund literature, management costs are an important,
but ambivalent, determinant of NAV discounts. For example, if the expected return
on the equity portfolio of a closed-end fund is 7%, fund fees of 1.5% per year can
considerably reduce that return after fees. Gemmill and Thomas (2002) document
that small closed-end funds, which often display large management costs, exhibit
larger discounts to NAV. On the other hand, Lenkey (2015) shows that the relation
between NAV discounts and management fees is not stable due to two opposing
eﬀects 1) larger fees reduce shareholder value 2) larger fees increase management
abilities.
During normal times, investors in open-end real estate funds can vote with their
feet, and sell their shares back to the fund if they believe management's fees are
excessive. This would decrease assets under management and hence fee income,
thereby incentivizing fund managers to act in line with investor interests. In con-
trast, investors in distressed real estate funds do not have the option to redeem
their shares to the fund, and are fully exposed to the fees set by management.
They can only choose to sell their shares on the secondary market, where assets
under management remain unaﬀected. This potential conﬂict of interest between
fund management and investors can have an eﬀect on NAV discounts if investors in
expensive funds are more inclined to sell their shares on the secondary market.
A similar conﬂict of interest arises because fund managers of distressed real estate
funds maximize fee income by delaying the liquidation process. During normal
times, investors in open-end real estate funds receive an annual dividend. When a
distressed fund is in the process of liquidating, however, investors receive additional
extraordinary payouts from the stepwise liquidation of the fund's real estate assets,
often on a semiannual basis. Here, large payouts may signal that fund management
is acting in the interest of investors, and is interested in a speedy liquidation process.
Accordingly, distressed funds with higher payout ratios are expected to trade at lower
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discounts to NAV compared to their peers with smaller payout ratios. Furthermore,
investors in funds with large NAV discounts may appreciate payouts, because the
dividend yields are considerably higher when calculated with respect to discounted
share prices rather than NAVs. Consistent with this idea, the literature on the
closed-end fund puzzle ﬁnds that low dividend payouts lead to larger discounts to
NAV (Pontiﬀ, 1996; Gemmill and Thomas, 2002; Cherkes, 2003; and Malkiel and
Xu, 2005). The potential conﬂict of interest between fund management and investors
leads to our second hypothesis concerning the discount to NAV of distressed real
estate funds:
Hypothesis 2: The discount to NAV increases when the fund management does
not act in the interest of fund investors.
4.3.3 Portfolio Quality
The anticipation of lower transaction prices than current appraisal values is a po-
tentially rational explanation for substantial discounts to NAV. Recent research
suggests that GDP may be a useful variable to forecast future direct real estate
prices. Using a global sample of oﬃce property prices, De Wit and van Dijk (2003)
ﬁnd that GDP positively inﬂuences direct real estate prices. Accordingly, NAV dis-
counts may be smaller if the fund's assets are located in countries with positive GDP
developments.
Another measure of the quality of a fund's property portfolio is average tenancy rate.
Wurtzebach et al. (1991) ﬁnd that high oﬃce vacancy rates (or low tenancy rates)
are associated with decreasing commercial real estate returns in the U.S. Hence,
higher tenancy rates may be perceived as a signal of the quality of a fund's property
portfolio, as well as more stable cash ﬂows and property values. In other words, we
posit that funds with higher tenancy rates are less likely to devalue their properties
in the near future. We thus expect a negative relationship between a fund's tenancy
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rate and its discount to NAV. Taken together, our two proxies for fund portfolio
quality lead to Hypothesis 3:
Hypothesis 3: The discount to NAV decreases with a fund's property portfolio
quality.
4.3.4 Spillover Eﬀects
Figure 4.2 shows the correlation of NAV discounts between funds over time, and
suggests the presence of a systematic component simultaneously aﬀecting the NAV
discounts of all funds. The ﬁnancial fragility of open-end real estate funds exhibits
some striking similarities to the banking sector. Spillover risk (where problems from
one bank can spread to others within the system) is a prime concern for authorities
and a rationale for regulating the ﬁnancial system. For example, Aharony and Swary
(1983) ﬁnd that large bank failures can lead to falling prices for solvent bank stocks
if the failures are caused by systemwide banking problems.
In the context of distressed real estate funds, negative spillover eﬀects may arise
from the announcement of another fund's closure or liquidation. Such an announce-
ment by other funds may increase doubts over the future development of the overall
asset class. Investors in distressed real estate funds who speculated on a successful
reopening may see their hopes vanish with the announcement of another fund's sus-
pensions of share redemptions. Similarly, the announcement of another distressed
real estate fund entering the liquidation phase may imply that the last chance for
a successful reopening has passed. As a result of negative industry news, the share
prices of distressed funds may fall even further, thereby increasing the discount to
NAV. This leads us to Hypothesis 4:
Hypothesis 4: The discount to NAV increases due to negative spillover eﬀects from
the announcement of other fund's closures or liquidations.
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4.3.5 Sentiment
Our next hypothesis aiming to explain the systematic component of NAV discounts
relates to industrywide or macroeconomic sentiment. In particular, we focus on
variables that proxy for industrywide sentiment toward the asset class. If investor
sentiment reﬂects investor behavior toward an asset class, we expect there to be
an eﬀect on the returns of the underlying securities. The returns on the secondary
market may then directly impact a widening or a compression of the discount to
NAV.
Indro (2004) ﬁnds a high correlation between aggregate equity fund ﬂows and other
measures of investor sentiment, such as the bullishness of individual investors or
newsletter writers. This suggests that fund ﬂows can be a useful proxy for investor
sentiment. Consistent with the hypothesis that investor sentiment aﬀects returns,
Warther (1995) ﬁnds a strong relationship between aggregate ﬂows into equity mu-
tual funds and contemporaneous returns of the securities held by these funds. Sim-
ilarly, Ben-Rephael et al. (2012) ﬁnd that monthly aggregate shifts between bond
funds and equity funds are positively correlated with contemporaneous aggregate
stock market excess returns.
In addition to industry-speciﬁc sentiment, the returns and NAV discounts of dis-
tressed real estate funds may also be driven by macroeconomic sentiment. Two
popular uncertainty indices are used commonly in the literature. First, the Eco-
nomic Policy Uncertainty Index of Baker et al. (2015) features prominently in a
plethora of research (e.g., European Central Bank, 2013, European Commission,
2013, and International Monetary Fund, 2014).11 Second, the implied volatility in-
dex (VIX), which proxy for stock market uncertainty, measure anticipated (implied)
stock market risk based on the diﬀerence between stock prices and stock price fu-
tures (e.g., Baker et al., 2015; Bekaert et al., 2013). This measure is important
because the funds are subject to common stock market risk after the event of clos-
11The full list can be found at: www.policyuncertainty.com/research.
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ing. The expected impact of sentiment on the discount to NAV of distressed funds
is summarized in Hypothesis 5:
Hypothesis 5: The discount to NAV increases with improving investor sentiment.
4.4 Data, Methodology and Sample Description
4.4.1 Data
Our sample consists of the population of all nine distressed German open-end real
estate funds.12 Table 4.1 provides an overview of the funds, as well as their closure,
reopening, and liquidation dates.
Our panel dataset covers the October 2008 through June 2016 period. The starting
point coincides with the closure of the nine funds. Subsequently, substantial diver-
gences between secondary market prices and NAVs emerged, which led to the NAV
spreads examined in this paper.
Following Lee et al. (1991) and Barkham and Ward (1999), we calculate the discount
to NAV as the diﬀerence between current NAV and the contemporary fund's market
price divided by current NAV. NAVs are published daily for each fund by the fund
management (KVG); market prices are provided by the Hamburg-Hannover stock
exchange.
Our fund-speciﬁc variables are hand-collected from the monthly fact sheets found on
the individual fund websites, as well as from funds' semiannual and annual reports.
Note that several funds are managed by depository banks that no longer provide
monthly fact sheets. Their annual and semiannual reports are also less detailed.
Hence, our explanatory variables are somewhat less up-to-date toward the end of
the sample.
12As noted earlier, we exclude the HansaImmobilia fund and the UniImmoGlobal fund.
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The share of institutional owners per fund comes from Morningstar Direct. We
also collect industrywide data on fund ﬂows from the German Investment and Asset
Management Association (BVI), which collects data about net ﬂows directly from its
members and represents the vast majority of the German mutual fund industry. The
dataset includes the monthly net ﬂows of forty-eight public and semi-institutional
German open-end real estate funds in our sample period.13 Data on GDP come
from the OECD.
4.4.2 Research Design and Deﬁnition of Variables
We use a panel regression model to examine the determinants of NAV discounts
for distressed real estate funds. Our unbalanced panel consists of 708 fund-month
observations. The key variable of interest is the discount to NAV of fund i at the
end of month t, which is calculated as follows:
Discount to NAVi,t =
Stock market pricei,t
NAV per sharei,t
− 1 (4.1)
For the purpose of our empirical tests, we estimate the following panel regression
13Since 2013, according to the German Central Bank, extraordinary payouts of distressed funds
have been considered as capital outﬂows (BVI, 2016). In contrast, all extraordinary payouts of
distressed funds are set equal to zero in order to standardize the calculations for both healthy and
distressed funds.
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model:
Discount to NAVi,t = α + β1 ∆ Leveragei,t−1 + β2 ∆ Liquidityi,t−1 + β3 ∆ TERi,t−1
+ β4 Extraordinary Payoutsi,t
+ β5 Economic Growth Target Marketsi,t−1 + β6 ∆ Tenancyi,t−1
+ β7 Flows Asset Classt + β8 Event Fund Liquidationt
+ β9 Event Fund Closuret
+ β10 Policy Uncertainty Index Europet + β11 V IX Europet
+ β12 ∆ Performi,t−1 + β13 ∆ Fund Sizei,t−1
β14 ∆ Institutionali,t−1 + β15 Fund Reopeningi,t
+ vi,t
(4.2)
We separate our key explanatory variables into fund-speciﬁc, external, and control
variables, as follows.
Leverage is the leverage ratio of the fund, calculated as the ratio of the fund's debt
relative to it's gross asset value (GAV).
Liquidity is the liquidity ratio, measured as the ratio of the fund's cash equivalents
to GAV.
TER represents annual management costs as a percent of fund volume. Because
investors can no longer vote with their feet, we expect to ﬁnd higher fees associated
with higher NAV discounts.
Extraordinary payouts are deﬁned as total fund-speciﬁc payouts in a given month
relative to a fund's NAV. Similarly to the TER ratio, this variable aims to capture
the degree of investor friendliness of a fund's management. A negative correlation
between this variable and the discount to NAV would indicate a lower degree of
conﬂicts of interest between investors and fund managers, leading to a smaller NAV
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discount.
Economic Growth Target Markets is a fund-speciﬁc GDP growth measure. This
variable aims to capture the anticipated price development of a fund's real estate
portfolio. It is calculated as the weighted sum of monthly GDP growth in the
individual funds' target country markets.
Tenancy represents the proportion of rented to overall space of the real estate fund's
assets. This variable is used to proxy for a fund's portfolio quality. As with the
previous variable, which captures the GDP development of the fund's underlying
property markets, a higher portfolio quality or better outlook is expected to lead to
a smaller discount to NAV.
Event Fund Closure is a 0/1 indicator variable that captures the announcement that
at least one other real estate fund has suspended share redemptions.
Event Fund Liquidation is a dummy variable that indicates another fund is unable
to reopen and has begun the liquidation process. Both events may lead to a deteri-
oration in investor sentiment. A positive relationship between these events and the
discount to NAV would generally conﬁrm the spillover hypothesis. We also include
closure or liquidation announcements from semi-institutional funds.
Flows Asset Class are the total net fund ﬂows (newly bought fund shares less re-
demptions) into all healthy open-end real estate funds. Here, we also include ﬂows
into semi-institutional funds. While only normally functioning open-end real estate
funds can have net ﬂows, we use this variable to capture general investor sentiment
toward the asset class.
Policy Uncertainty Index Europe aims to capture the degree of political uncertainty
in Europe. To construct this Index, Baker et al. (2015) ﬁrst select two inﬂuential
newspapers for each European country, such as, e.g., Le Monde and Le Figaro for
France, or Handelsblatt and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung for Germany, etc.
Next, the authors count the number of articles that include the terms uncertain,
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uncertainty, economic, or economy, and at least one policy-relevant item. The
count is scaled by the overall number of articles in each newspaper.
VIX Europe is the Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX), commonly referred to
as VIX. This is our second measure of macroeconomic uncertainty. This index mea-
sures the anticipated (implied) stock market risk based on the diﬀerence between
stock prices and stock price futures. Both macroeconomic indices are normalized
(i.e., the mean was subtracted, and all values subsequently divided by their stan-
dard deviations). This transformation allows us to not only interpret the sign and
statistical signiﬁcance of the respective regression coeﬃcients, but also to compare
the magnitudes of both coeﬃcients. Our set of control variables consists of a fund's
past performance, fund size, and share of institutional owners, as well as a dummy
variable indicating whether the distressed real estate fund of interest already expe-
rienced a suspension of share redemptions and subsequent reopening.
Performance is the appraisal-based rolling twelve-month performance according to
BVI. This variable basically reﬂects the NAV performance. On the one hand, high
returns are indicative of solid fund performance. On the other hand, it may signal
that the fund has not yet adjusted its appraisal values to reﬂect lower market values.
This would imply that NAV per share is expected to fall in the future, thereby
justifying a larger discount.
Fund Size is measured in billions of Euros. The Federal Financial Supervisory Au-
thority (BaFin) of Germany determines an individual liquidation horizon for each
fund. Larger funds tend to receive more time to liquidate their portfolio compared
to smaller ones. Therefore, on the one hand, fund size could be interpreted as a
proxy for expected liquidation time. Hence, we would expect a positive relation-
ship between fund size and NAV discounts. On the other hand, larger funds with
longer liquidation horizons might use an optimized market timing strategy for their
property disposals, and could enjoy better bargaining positions.
Institutional shareholders represents the share of institutional shareholders as pro-
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vided by Morningstar Direct. Here, too, the expected eﬀect is ambivalent. German
open-end real estate funds are predominantly held by retail investors. Thus, due to
their low price volatility and relatively high and stable yields compared to money
market interest rates, conventional wisdom suggests that institutional investors ex-
ploited open-end funds as a cash substitute prior to the fund crisis. We use share
of institutional ownership to test whether it has an eﬀect on the discount to NAV.
Once open-end real estate funds become distressed, their share prices on the sec-
ondary market show substantial price volatility. Therefore, investors are likely to
reevaluate their optimal risk exposure to the asset class, and could potentially de-
cide to sell their shares. This could lead to further price pressure on the secondary
market, and hence larger discounts to NAV. Consistent with this idea, Larrain et
al. (2017) examine the eﬀect of a regulatory constraint, which forced pension funds
to ﬁre sale their Chilean stock holdings. The authors ﬁnd that those stocks with
the highest selling pressure lost 4% compared to other stocks. Alternatively, a large
percent of well-informed institutional investors may signal high fund quality, and
could be associated with lower discounts to NAV. Evidence in the related literature
is mixed. Barclay et al. (1993) ﬁnd that closed-end funds with large blockholders
display larger discounts. In contrast, Morri and Benedetto (2009) ﬁnd that Italian
closed-end real estate funds with large blockholders tend to exhibit smaller discounts
to NAV.
Fund Reopening is a dummy variable that indicates whether a distressed real estate
fund has already reopened previously, and hence suspended share redemptions for
a second time. Investors may perceive such funds as less likely to achieve another
reopening, thus leading to larger discounts to NAV.
Our regression results are estimated using cross-sectional ﬁxed eﬀects and
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
Fund-speciﬁc variables generally enter the regression model with one lag, because
the monthly fact sheets are published with a time lag. Also, investors need time to
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adjust their decision making process subsequent to changes in key fund indicators.
However, we include extraordinary payouts, net capital inﬂows, dummy variables,
and uncertainty indicators without any lag. Extraordinary Payouts, the closure
or liquidation of one or more speciﬁc open-end real estate funds, is generally a
comprehensive event that would be extensively reported in the media. Therefore,
we would expect both institutional and private investors to recognize the enormity of
such an event, and adjust their investment strategies within one month. Moreover,
uncertainty is a prevalent condition. In addition to the economic interpretation, the
statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients, as well as the overall ﬁtness measures like
the AIC criteria, support the chosen lag structure as explained above.
Due to the non-stationarity of the leverage ratio, the liquidity ratio, TER, the ten-
ancy rate, performance, fund size, and the share of institutional investors, these
variables enter the regression with their ﬁrst diﬀerences (∆).
4.4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.2 shows some descriptive statistics on the dependent and explanatory vari-
ables. Table 4.2 reveals that the average discount to NAV of distressed real estate
funds is 25% with a standard deviation of 13.3%.
The independent variables in Table 4.2 are separated into three categories: fund-
speciﬁc, external variables, and control variables.
The average leverage ratio of all funds is 24.8%. Figure 4.4 shows that the average
leverage ratio diminishes considerably over time. This eﬀect is to be expected, be-
cause funds repay their loans from the proceeds from property disposals. There is
also a substantial heterogeneity of leverage ratios across funds. The DEGI Inter-
national fund reports a leverage ratio of 0% in June 2014, the Morgan Stanley P2
value fund exhibits a leverage ratio of 69% at the beginning of 2014.
The liquidity ratios also show considerable heterogeneity. The TMW Immobilien
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Table 4.2: Overview Summary Statistics
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs
Discount to NAV 0.267 0.133 0.000 0.598 783
Fund Speciﬁc Variables
Leverage 0.248 0.157 0.000 0.690 837
Liquidity 0.200 0.142 0.003 0.828 837
TER 0.009 0.002 0.003 0.015 837
Extraordinary Payouts 0.012 0.05 0.000 0.565 837
Economic Growth Target Markets 0.001 0.006 -0.031 0.013 836
Tenancy 0.893 0.077 0.595 1.000 815
External Variables
Event Fund Liquidation 0.129 0.335 0.000 1.000 837
Event Fund Closure 0.129 0.335 0.000 1.000 837
Flows Asset Class 0.215 0.651 -4.358 1.693 837
Policy Uncertainty Index Europe 174.315 47.613 91.379 394.635 837
VIX Europe 26.400 8.832 14.392 60.677 837
Control Variables
Perform -0.045 0.086 -0.389 0.086 816
Fund Size 2.140 1.970 0.069 6.598 837
Institutional 0.111 0.092 0.003 0.368 792
Fund Reopening 0.671 0.470 0.000 1.000 837
This table provides an overview of the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and the number of obser-
vations for all variables.
Weltfonds fund displays a liquidity ratio of 0.3% in May 2016, which is below the
regulatory threshold of 5.0% and is allowed for only a short period of time. However,
this fund exhibit a signiﬁcantly low liquidity ratio over the entire sample period. In
contrast, the UBS 3 Sector Real Estate fund has a liquidity ratio of 21.6% at the
closing date, which rises as high as 82.8% by September 2015. Note that fund strate-
gies partially cause these substantial diﬀerences. During the sample period, DEGI
International fund liquidated a signiﬁcant portion of its assets without substantial
extraordinary payouts until October 2014. On average, the liquidity ratio amounts
to about 20.0%. Figure 4.4 illustrates the considerable increase in average liquidity
ratios over time due to high sales proceeds beginning in Q3 2012.
The average total expense ratio is 0.9%. The KanAm Grundinvest fund has the
highest management fees at the end of the sample period in 2016 with 1.5%, while
the AXA Immoselect fund exhibits the lowest fees at 0.3% in October 2008.
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The average payout ratio is only 1.2%. The UBS 3 Sector Real Estate fund made an
extraordinary payment of about 56.5% of its respective market value in December
2015. Other funds distributed their payouts more evenly over the sample period,
however, the management of AXA Immoselect fund continuously distributed about
3%-4% of its respective market value per share from 2008 through 2013. Figure 4.4
illustrates the signiﬁcant increase in extraordinary payouts due to the accelerating
liquidation process, which began in Q3 2012.
The average GDP growth rate of the fund's target markets is 0.1% and it ranges
from -3.1% to +1.3%. While there is little heterogeneity across funds regarding this
measure, Figure 4.4 shows a substantial time variation that is attributable to the
economic rebound following the global ﬁnancial crisis.
The average tenancy rate is 89.3%. Table 4.2 shows that the Morgan Stanley P2
Value fund exhibited a tenancy rate of 100% over the June-December 2013 period,
while TMW Immobilien Weltfonds fund reported only 76% to 69% during the same
period.
On average, a closure or a liquidation occurred in 12.9% of the periods. Consistent
with the spillover hypothesis, Figure 4.4 shows that closures and liquidations tend
to cluster together over time.
The average asset class capital inﬂows are EUR 215 million per month. The funds
experienced strong capital inﬂows of about EUR 1.69 billion in January 2010, and
rather extreme capital outﬂows of EUR 4.36 billion in October 2008.
Figure 4.4 shows that the implied stock market volatility, as measured by VIX
Europe, tends to decline over time. In contrast, the Political Uncertainty Index
increases during the middle of our sample period, when many funds entered the
liquidation phase.
Table 4.3 shows a positive correlation on an aggregate level between the absolute
level of the NAV discount and the European Policy Uncertainty Index (general un-
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certainty) of (+0.36). However, on the other hand, we observe an inverse relationship
between the absolute level of the discount to NAV and the VIX (stock market un-
certainty) of (-0.45). Although both uncertainty indices share two peaks, in 2008
(global ﬁnancial crisis) and 2012 (European debt crisis), they appear uncorrelated
in general.
The rolling twelve-month performance of the funds (based on NAVs) averages -4.5%,
and it ranges from -38.9% to +8.6%. Just as with overall economic development,
the variance of this variable is driven mainly by the time dimension, namely, the
global ﬁnancial crisis.
Fund size ranges from EUR 69 million to EUR 6.6 billion. The UBS 3 Sector Real
Estate fund is the smallest fund, with an average size over the entire sample period
of EUR 321.0 million. The CS Euroreal A fund is the largest, with an average of
EUR 5.0 billion. Despite the negative time trend, the time dimension explains only a
small part of the overall variance of the fund size variable. Institutional shareholders
on average represent 11.1% of all fund investors. The UBS 3 Sector Real Estate fund
reports an institutional share of up to 37%, while the DEGI Europa never exceeds
more than 5%.
According to Table 4.3, the discount to NAV shows a relatively strong negative
correlation with the fund size (-0.25) and fund performance (-0.56) variables. Fur-
thermore, the NAV discounts show a relatively strong positive correlation with the
share of institutional investors (0.35).
4.5 Results
Table 4.4 contains the panel regression results, which are estimated using cross-
sectional and time-ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as the heteroscedasticity-robust standard
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errors.14 Model I employs only fund-speciﬁc explanatory variables, which are used to
test Hypotheses 1-3. The control variables, used in all models, are also fund-speciﬁc.
In models II and III, we subsequently introduce further explanatory variables that
are external to the funds. Model II includes two industrywide variables, which
enables us to test the spillover hypothesis (Hypothesis 4). Finally, model III also
incorporates macroeconomic variables in order to test Hypothesis 5.15 The standard
errors of the regression coeﬃcients are in parentheses.
Our initial analysis focuses on the impact of a fund's ﬁnancial leverage on its discount
to NAV. We ﬁnd that the discount to NAV increases with the leverage ratio. An
increase in the absolute diﬀerence of the leverage ratio by 1% leads on average and
c.p. to a 0.089% larger discount to NAV in the next period. Mirroring this principle,
the liquidity ratio has a negative eﬀect on the discount to NAV. A rise in the lagged
absolute diﬀerence of the liquidity ratio by 1% leads on average and c.p. to a 0.139%
lower discount to NAV. This is plausible, given that a larger share of cash and short-
term money market positions represents money saved for fund investors. Therefore,
larger liquidity ratios diminish risk, which is primarily related to the appraisal values
of the real estate portion of the fund. In summary, both of our proxies are consistent
with Hypothesis 1. The discount to NAV is driven by a fund's ﬁnancial leverage,
since it increases (decreases) with its leverage (liquidity) ratio.
Next, we examine whether NAV discounts are related to potential conﬂicts of in-
terest between fund management and investors. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant inﬂuence
of management costs (TER) on the NAV discount. Extraordinary payouts, on the
other hand, play an important role. A 1% higher payout leads on average and
c.p. to a 0.273% lower discount. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 2. If
14Time-ﬁxed eﬀects enable us to control for any unobserved time eﬀects. However, the time
dummies also cause identical regression coeﬃcients for the fund-speciﬁc variables across all three
speciﬁcations. In the next chapter, we describe a possible method by which to conﬁrm the goodness
of ﬁt for each model speciﬁcation.
15In untabulated results, we also control for the time to liquidation date and the legal fund
environment, e.g., the selling restrictions of the real estate properties. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
inﬂuence of these regulatory variables on the discount to NAV. We also ﬁnd no signiﬁcant inﬂuence
of regional or sectoral diversiﬁcation (Herﬁndahl index) on the discount to NAV.
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Table 4.4: Explaining the Discount to NAV
(I) (II) (III)
Fund Speciﬁc Variables
∆ Leveragei,t−1 0.0898* 0.0898* 0.0898*
(0.0475) (0.0475) (0.0475)
∆ Liquidityi,t−1 -0.139** -0.139** -0.139**
(0.0588) (0.0588) (0.0588)
∆ TERi,t−1 -1.702 -1.702 -1.702
(5.059) (5.059) (5.059)
Extraordinary Payoutsi,t -0.273*** -0.273*** -0.273***
(0.0643) (0.0643) (0.0643)
Economic Growth Target Marketsi,t−1 0.193 0.193 0.193
(1.936) (1.936) (1.936)
∆ Tenancyi,t−1 -0.116 -0.116 -0.116
(0.0919) (0.0919) (0.0919)
External Variables
Event Fund Liquidationi,t - 0.249*** 0.148***
- (0.045) (0.0343)
Event Fund Closurei,t - 0.028 0.00218
- (0.034) (0.0682)
Flows Asset Classi,t - - -0.0308*
- - (0.0142)
Policy Uncertainty Index Europei,t* - - 0.0377***
- - (0.00727)
V IX Europei,t* - - -0.0133
- - (0.0142)
Control Variables
∆ Performi,t−1 -0.0788 -0.0788 -0.0788
(0.127) (0.127) (0.127)
∆ Fund Sizei,t−1 0.00239 0.00239 0.00239
(0.0377) (0.0377) (0.0377)
∆ Institutionali,t−1 0.478** 0.478** 0.478**
(0.167) (0.167) (0.167)
Fund Reopeningi,t 0.0283 0.0283 0.0283
(0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0361)
Constant 0.0540** 0.0908*** 0.129**
(0.0198) (0.0263) (0.0408)
Observations 708 708 708
R-squared 0.735 0.735 0.735
Number of funds 9 9 9
This table shows the ﬁxed-eﬀects panel regression results. Model (I) contains the particular inﬂuence of the fund-
speciﬁc variables. Model (II) adds the industry-wide variables to test the spillover hypothesis. Model (III) is the main
model, which also includes industry-wide and macroeconomic proxies for investor sentiment. Policy Uncertainty and
VIX Europe Variables are standardized with zero mean and a standard deviation of one. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1.
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fund management regularly pays out high amounts of liquidity, rather than hold-
ing cash or properties to maximize their fee income, this signals a certain amount
of investor friendliness. The practice of extraordinary payouts at time of closing,
however, diﬀers considerably among funds in the dataset. Some closed funds eﬀect
constant substantial payments on a semiannual or annual basis. Others pay more
irregularly or infrequently. A history of regular distributions increases trust in fund
management, and could inﬂuence investors to remain invested.
To test Hypothesis 3, we have two variables that proxy for a fund's portfolio quality.
First, real estate funds are more likely to be able to sell assets for reasonable prices
in good-performing countries than in countries locked in recession. Investors are
informed about the target market mix through monthly, semiannual, and annual
fund reports. Moreover, investors receive continuous information about economic
development via the media. Both sources of information should theoretically lead
to higher demand on the secondary market for funds invested in more prosperous
markets. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the Economic Growth
variable on the discount to NAV. Our second proxy for fund portfolio quality is
average tenancy rate. On average, higher quality properties should be associated
with larger tenancy rates, and vice versa. However, the coeﬃcient on the tenancy
rate is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Hence, we ﬁnd no evidence
for Hypothesis 3, i.e., NAV discounts do not appear to be driven by a fund's portfolio
quality. A possible explanation for this result could be that a fund's portfolio quality
is already suﬃciently reﬂected in its NAV. Hence, investors would not need an
additional risk premium, and this would be reﬂected in lower share prices.
Our regression results in model II provide support for the spillover hypothesis. In
the case of another distressed real estate fund failing to reopen and subsequently
announcing its liquidation, the discount to NAV for all distressed funds rises c.p. and
on average by 0.249%. This eﬀect remains signiﬁcant, although somewhat weaker,
in model III, when further external variables are included in the regression model.
The announcement of other fund liquidations may lead to diminished hope, and is
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likely to further deteriorate investor trust in this asset class. The announcement of
other fund closures, on the other hand, does not appear to signiﬁcantly impact the
NAV discount.
We have three proxy variables to test whether NAV discounts are driven by in-
vestor sentiment. First, we use capital inﬂows into all open-end real estate funds
to examine the impact of investor sentiment toward the speciﬁc asset class on NAV
discounts. Model III documents a signiﬁcant relationship between asset class net
ﬂows and the discount to NAV. Larger fund ﬂows into the overall asset class c.p.
and on average diminish the discount to NAV. Second, we use the European Policy
Uncertainty index, which measures overall macroeconomic uncertainty. An increase
in this Index leads c.p. and on average to a larger NAV discount. In contrast, when
we use the VIX to measure speciﬁc stock market risk, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect
between the VIX Europe and the NAV discount.16 In conclusion, we ﬁnd evidence
for Hypothesis 5, when our proxy for investor sentiment is based on fund ﬂows and
political uncertainty.
Regarding our control variables, we ﬁnd a positive relationship between the share
of institutional investors and the discount to NAV. An increase in the absolute
diﬀerence of the share of institutional investors by 1% leads on average and c.p. to
a 0.478% larger discount in the next period. Past performance, fund size, and the
dummy variable indicating a former fund closure are all statistically insigniﬁcant.
In order to determine the goodness of ﬁt of our models, we use the time dummy
coeﬃcients of the three model speciﬁcations (I-III). Because the dummy variables
have no economic interpretation, we consider the coeﬃcients to be the unexplained,
yet time-speciﬁc, components of the discount to NAV. Figure 4.5 illustrates how the
unexplained (unsystematic) time eﬀects diminish after we incorporate additional
time-dependent variables into the model. The ﬁgure shows the progression of the
time dummy coeﬃcients over ninety periods from January 2009 to June 2016 (ninety-
16In untabulated results, we ﬁnd a positive relationship between the VIX Europe and discounts
to NAV when we run the regression without the Political Uncertainty Index.
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Figure 4.5: Development of Time Dummies
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This ﬁgure shows the regression coeﬃcients of the time dummies for the ninety periods from January 2009 through
June 2016 (note there is a loss of three periods at the beginning due to the preferred lag structure). The regression
coeﬃcients of these dummy variables represent the unexplained but time-speciﬁc component of the discount to NAV.
The progression of each line near zero indicates a better ﬁt of the model compared to the other model speciﬁcations,
as there is less unexplained variance left.
three periods in total, minus three periods for the lag structure). The time dummy
coeﬃcients of model I exhibit considerably positive signs over time. Moreover, the
parabolic progression indicates a time trend that we can account for by using the
monthly time dummies in the regression model. This parabolic progression can
also be seen in the development of the discount to NAV, which increases after the
individual closure dates for each fund to a maximum in mid-2012, and signiﬁcantly
decreases thereafter by about 20%-30% until June 2016. Model II exhibits a less
distinct time trend. Model III, which includes all variables, has the best ﬁt and,
therefore, the least distinct time trend of the dummy regression coeﬃcients.
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4.6 Conclusion
This paper examines the discounts to NAV of distressed open-end real estate funds.
The stock market prices of distressed real estate funds are up to 60% lower than
their NAVs. These discounts can be interpreted as a compensation for the valuation
risk associated with the fund liquidation process and a sudden decrease in liquidity.
Open-end real estate funds diﬀer fundamentally from mutual funds, because the
underlying properties are not traded on a stand-alone basis in public markets as in
the case of stocks. Accounting for the speciﬁc environment of open-end real estate
funds, this paper contributes to the literature on NAV discounts, as well as to the
empirical literature on liquidity crises of open-end real estate funds in general.
To explain the major factors driving the NAV discounts of distressed real estate
funds, we categorize the explanatory variables into internal or fund-speciﬁc vari-
ables, and into industrywide or macroeconomic variables that are external to the
funds. Overall, we ﬁnd notable diﬀerences between the individual funds (cross-
sectional heterogeneity), but the variance of the discount is also driven considerably
by time-dependent factors. On the fund-speciﬁc side, we provide evidence that the
discount to NAV is related to the degree of ﬁnancial leverage employed by the funds.
Funds with high liquidity ratios and/or low leverage ratios tend to be associated with
lower NAV discounts. This suggests that a more conservative strategy by fund man-
agement may help decrease the discounts. Moreover, we ﬁnd that funds with higher
payout ratios trade at lower NAV discounts. This is consistent with our hypothesis
that funds paying out more to investors are signaling greater investor friendliness.
However, some factors are not under the control of fund management. For example,
we ﬁnd evidence of negative spillover eﬀects from the liquidation announcements
of other funds. Furthermore, we ﬁnd evidence that NAV discounts are driven by
investor sentiment, as evidenced by the impact from fund ﬂows into the asset class
and the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty.
Chapter 5
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This dissertation aims to analyze the structural risks of ﬁnancial intermediation as-
sociated with real estate investments. In particular, I analyze how life insurance
companies in Europe and open-end real estate funds in Germany have reacted to
the economic turmoil in the aftermath of the great ﬁnancial crisis after 2007/2008.
The analyzed time period has been characterized by historically high economic un-
certainty and historically low interest rates. Both factors serve as unique conditions
for stress testing the aforementioned vehicles and for drawing conclusions about
the structural risks involved with the respective transformation of risk, return and
liquidity.
Chapter 1 provides a general rationale for ﬁnancial intermediation in association
with real estate investments. The chapter also brieﬂy touches on the structural
risks analyzed later in the dissertation (i.e., insolvency of a life insurance company
due to sustainably low interest rates and insolvency of open-end real estate funds
due to sustainably negative fund ﬂows).
In Part 1 of the dissertation (Chapter 2), I examine the impact of a new risk-based
regulatory framework (Solvency II) on the attainability of target returns and port-
folio eﬃciency of European life endowment insurers. Initially, the combination of
very low yields on government bonds and high interest rate guarantees on exist-
ing life endowment policies results in a severe undercoverage for life endowment
insurers. Beyond that, higher-yielding asset classes have high capital requirements
according to Solvency II. Solvency II therefore prevents the insurers from reallo-
cating their portfolios towards higher target returns and thus prevents them from
earning their required returns and fulﬁlling their interest rate guarantees. To some
extent, Solvency's high capital charges are economically reasonable, since higher-
yielding assets are generally subject to more market risk. However, my results show
that the regulator misunderstands real estate as an asset class and does not account
for its heterogeneity, its diversiﬁcation potential in a mixed asset portfolio and its
interest rate sensitivity in an asset liability context. Due to these misspeciﬁcations,
many insurers will neither be able to earn their target returns with their currently
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bond-based portfolio, nor will they be able to increase their portfolio weights for
real estate in order to earn higher returns and diversify their portfolios.
In Part 2 of the dissertation (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), I analyze the crisis of
open-end real estate funds in Germany. During the fund crisis starting in October
2008, almost one-third of all German open-end real estate retail funds were forced
to suspend their share redemptions. As a consequence, the funds' management was
forced to liquidate the funds by selling the real estate assets. Nine funds were even
forced to ultimately liquidate their entire portfolios. The results of Chapter 3 show
that, above all, fund run risk (i.e., substantial negative fund ﬂows) and industrywide
spillover eﬀects can cause a fund to suspend share redemptions. Economies of scale
and scope (i.e., fund size, age, and the presence of a distribution network for fund
shares) reduce the probability of fund closures. A greater share of institutional in-
vestors increases the probability of fund closures. Once a fund has closed, investors
could either await the stepwise liquidation of funds' assets or sell their shares on the
secondary market, often at a substantial discount to net asset value of up to 60%.
The discount to NAV is positively correlated with the fund's leverage ratio and neg-
atively with the share of liquid assets. The results also show that the NAV discounts
are driven by spillover eﬀects from the announcement of other fund liquidations and
by investor sentiment, which is represented by the aggregate level of fund inﬂows
into the industry (i.e., all analyzed funds) and by the degree of macroeconomic un-
certainty. The most critical factor for both funds closures and subsequent discounts
to NAV prove to be the fund ﬂows from and into the individual funds as well as
those on industry level. This result suggests that open-end real estate funds are
misspeciﬁed in the sense that they provide too much liquidity and don't limit fund
ﬂows before the funds are forced to suspend share redemptions.
As an overall conclusion, the functioning of an indirect investment vehicle, espe-
cially in times of economic turmoil, depends on its structure, which is deﬁned by
a regulatory framework. Life endowment insurers turned out to be regulated too
strictly and in an undiﬀerentiated manner when it comes to real estate investments.
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This makes real estate an unattractive and expensive asset class from an economic
capital perspective and prevents life insurers from further expanding their real estate
quotas. On the other hand, open-end real estate funds turned out to be regulated
insuﬃciently when it comes to liquidity transformation. During the analyzed time
period, the funds allowed investors to purchase and redeem shares on a daily ba-
sis, thus providing almost unrestricted liquidity, which led to massive negative fund
ﬂows, fund closings and high NAV discounts. In the case of life endowment insurers,
the EIOPA does not intend to adjust the property risk module of the Solvency II
framework. In the case of open-end real estate funds, the KAGB framework was
already subject to a series of changes in order to readjust the liquidity of open-end
real estate funds. Those changes include a minimum holding period of 24 months
for new investors and a notice period for share redemptions of 12 months.
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